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THE FINANCIAL CONDITION AND INSURANCE
POLICY LIMITS OF A JOINT TORTFEASOR
WISHING TO SETTLE IN GOOD FAITH: PROBLEMS
OF DISCOVERY AND CONFIDENTIALITY
Florrie Young Roberts*
I. INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court made a major change in the law
governing settlements in multi-party tort cases with its decision in
Tech-Bilt Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde Associates.' That case involved
the appropriate definition of a good faith settlement-a device by
which one joint tortfeasor can settle with the plaintiff and thereby
free himself from claims by his joint tortfeasors for partial indemnity
based on comparative fault. Overruling a majority of appellate court
decisions on the subject," the supreme court held that a settlement is
in good faith only if the amount of the settlement is within the rea-
sonable range of the settling tortfeasor's proportionate share of com-
parative liability for the plaintiff's injuries.3
In its enumeration of the factors that a trial court should con-
sider in determining whether a settlement falls within the reasonable
range, the supreme court identified the financial condition and the
insurance policy limits of the settling joint tortfeasor.4 Thus, under
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1. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
2. The following decisions were expressly disapproved by the California Supreme Court
in Tech-Bilt: Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981);
Cardio Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981); Bur-
lington Northern R.R. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 187 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1982).
Other cases that were impliedly disapproved insofar as they utilized or referred to the disap-
proved test for good faith are: Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. App. 3d 280, 212
Cal. Rptr. 389 (1985); Anderson v. International Harvester Co., 165 Cal. App. 3d 112, 211
Cal. Rptr. 253 (1985); Henderson v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 3d 297, 208 Cal. Rptr.
484 (1984); Ford Motor Co. v. Schultz, 147 Cal. App. 3d 941, 195 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1983);
Wysong & Miles Co. v. Western Indus. Movers, 143 Cal. App. 3d 278, 191 Cal. Rptr. 671
(1983); Fisher v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 433, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1980).
3. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166,
213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
4. Id. at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
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the Tech-Bilt test, the financial resources of the settling tortfeasor are
relevant to the issue of the good faith of his settlement.
By including the financial condition and insurance policy limits
of the settling tortfeasor among the factors of a good faith settlement,
the supreme court has complicated other aspects of the litigation be-
tween the parties and has created new areas of uncertainty for the
trial judge. This article addresses two threshold procedural problems
that will confront a judge even before he can rule on the substantive
issue of whether a settlement is in good faith.
The first problem relates to the discovery of the financial condi-
tion and insurance policy limits of the settling joint tortfeasor. If a
settling tortfeasor claims his proposed settlement is in good faith be-
cause of his limited financial resources, the nonsettling joint
tortfeasors will legitimately seek to discover the settlor's financial sta-
tus and insurance policy limits in order to adequately prepare for the
hearing on the good faith issue. The settlor, on the other hand, will
invoke his constitutionally mandated right of privacy to protect his
financial affairs from pretrial discovery. This article suggests the is-
suance of an appropriate protective order as a solution to this conflict
and offers guidelines a trial judge can use in fashioning such an or-
der. These discovery issues are dealt with in Parts III and IV of this
article.
The second problem concerns the structure of the good faith set-
tlement hearing itself. If the court finds that the settling tortfeasor is
entitled to some sort of protection of his financial information, the
trial judge must then establish procedural rules for the good faith
settlement hearing so that the confidentiality of the financial infor-
mation can be maintained without sacrificing the adverse party's
rights to a full and fair hearing. Part V of this article addresses these
considerations and similarly suggests guidelines for the trial judge.
These problems regarding the discoverability and confidentiality
of the settling defendant's financial status were not addressed by the
supreme court in Tech-Bilt. In all likelihood, they were not even
considered by the court at this initial stage of the development of the
new test of good faith.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to analyze the discovery and confidentiality issues
raised by the supreme court's definition of a good faith settlement, it
is necessary to understand what a good faith settlement is, how it
operates, and how good faith is defined.
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A. The Good Faith Settlement in Context-The Comparative
Fault Framework
The good faith settlement is a small but important component
of the overall scheme in California of comparative fault, joint and
several liability, and partial indemnity. In American Motorcycle As-
sociation v. Superior Court,5 the California Supreme Court applied
the rule of comparative negligence to multi-tortfeasor situations and
thereby established that all tortfeasors responsible for plaintiff's inju-
ries would be obligated to pay in accordance with their percentage of
fault.'
1. Joint and Several Liability
An integral part of the comparative negligence system in Cali-
fornia is the doctrine of joint and several liability. Under the rule ofjoint and several liability, each joint tortfeasor8 is personally liable
for the total amount of the damages sustained by the plaintiff, even
though the independent negligent actions of a number of tortfeasors
were each a proximate cause of the plaintiff's single injury.9 As a
result, the plaintiff may recover the entire amount of his damages
not attributable to his own fault from any joint tortfeasor found lia-
ble, regardless of the percentage of fault of that particular
tortfeasor.' 0 From whom and in what amounts he chooses to collect
his judgment are completely within the discretion of the plaintiff.
For example, if the jury awards plaintiff a $100,000 judgment
5. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
6. Id. at 608, 578 P.2d at 918, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 201. The American Motorcycle deci-
sion was an extension of the court's prior decision in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804,
532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975), which established California's comparative negli-
gence system by replacing the doctrine of contributory negligence with a comparative negli-
gence scheme in two party cases.
7. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 590-91, 578 P.2d at 906-
07, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189-90.
8. The term "joint tortfeasor" applies both to tortfeasors acting in concert and to concur-
rent tortfeasors who, although acting independently, cause an indivisible injury. Turcon Con-
str. Inc. v. Norton Villiers, Ltd., 139 Cal. App. 3d 280, 282-83, 188 Cal. Rptr. 580, 581-82
(1983).
9. 20 Cal. 3d at 587, 578 P.2d at 904, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 187. Liability attaches to a
concurrent tortfeasor not because he is responsible for the acts of other independent tortfeasors
who may also cause the injury, but because he is responsible for all damage of which his own
negligence was a proximate cause. Id. at 589, 578 P.2d at 905, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188. There-
fore, even though comparative negligence assigns some percentage figure to the relative culpa-
bility of one negligent defendant as compared to another, this does not suggest that each de-
fendant's negligence is not a proximate cause of the entire indivisible injury. Id. at 589, 578
P.2d at 905, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
10. Id. at 587, 578 P.2d at 904, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
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against co-defendants A and B, and finds defendant A ten percent at
fault and defendant B ninety percent at fault, the plaintiff may re-
cover the entire $100,000 or any portion thereof from defendant A,
even though A's proportionate share of the liability is actually only
$10,000.11 Defendant A could then attempt to apportion the loss
among himself and defendant B," but this would not concern the
plaintiff who had exercised the right to be totally compensated from
defendant A.
The purpose of the joint and several liability rule is to provide
adequate compensation to plaintiffs.' s This rule allows an injured
plaintiff to obtain full recovery for his injuries even when one of the
responsible parties does not have the financial resources to cover his
liability. 4 Thus, the risk of one joint tortfeasor's inability to pay his
share of the damages is imposed on the remaining defendants, not on
the plaintiff. 5
2. Partial Indemnity
Although the court in American Motorcycle allowed a plaintiff
to collect the entire amount of his judgment from his choice of negli-
gent defendants, the court opened an avenue of relief for the joint
tortfeasor who had been called upon to pay more than his propor-
tionate share of damages. He could pursue an action for partial in-
demnity"6 against his fellow tortfeasors on a comparative fault ba-
sis.17 As the name implies, the purpose of the action for partial
11. Plaintiff could have also chosen to sue only defendant A and then collect the entire
judgment from him, even though B was also at fault.
12. This apportionment would be accomplished by a suit for partial indemnity. See in-
fra text accompanying notes 16-21.
13. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 590, 578 P.2d at 906,
146 Cal. Rptr. at 189. The alternative to the joint and several liability rule is the rule of
several liability which would limit a joint tortfeasor's liability to his allocable share of fault. In
other words, in the above hypothetical, this alternative would mean that the plaintiff could
collect only $10,000 from A and $90,000 from B. The supreme court rejected this alternative in
American Motorcycle principally because of the "serious and unwarranted deleterious effect" it
would have on the "practical ability of negligently injured persons to receive adequate compen-
sation for their injuries." Id.
14. Id. The supreme court referred to this as "one of the principal by-products of the
joint and several liability rule." Id.
15. Fleming, Report to the Joint Committee of the California Legislature on Tort Lia-
bility on the Problems Associated with American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 1464, 1483 (1979).
16. The term "partial indemnity" is used in American Motorcycle and will be used in
this article. Other terms used to describe the same principle are "equitable indemnity" and
"comparative indemnity."
17. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 591, 578 P.2d at 907,
[Vol. 26
JOINT TORTFEASOR CONFIDENTIALITY
indemnity is to allow an equitable balancing among those liable for
the injury. Through such a lawsuit, a tortfeasor who has paid more
than the amount warranted by his percentage of negligence can ob-
tain reimbursement from the other tortfeasors in proportion to the
fault attributable to each.s This right may be asserted by a defend-
ant against any joint tortfeasor, whether named by the plaintiff in
the original action or not, 9 and may be asserted either by cross-
complaint 0 or independent action."
As an example, consider the above hypothetical in which plain-
tiff obtained full payment of his $100,000 judgment from defendant
A who was only ten percent at fault. After such payment, A could
assert a claim for partial indemnity against defendant B and could
recover the amount of the judgment that A paid in excess of A's
percentage of fault. Accordingly, A could recover $90,000 from B
because B was ninety percent at fault. Thus, the eventual result is
that each tortfeasor pays an amount equivalent to his percentage of
fault.
B. The Good Faith Settlement
1. The Ramifications of a Finding of Good Faith
One important roadblock exists for the joint tortfeasor who has
paid more than his proportionate share of plaintiff's damages and
seeks to reapportion the loss among the other tortfeasors by a suit for
partial indemnity. This hurdle is the good faith settlement. If one
joint tortfeasor settles with the plaintiff prior to trial, and that settle-
ment is found to be in good faith, the other joint tortfeasors are pro-
hibited from seeking partial indemnity from the settling joint
tortfeasor.22 Instead, the dollar amount of the settlement is deducted
146 Cal. Rptr. at 190. For a more detailed discussion of the origins of the doctrine of partial
indemnity, see Roberts, The "Good Faith" Settlement: An Accommodation of Competing
Goals, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 841, 846-51 (1984).
18. Id. at 591, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
19. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 606, 578 P.2d at 917,
146 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
20. Id. at 607, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
21. E.L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach, 21 Cal. 3d 497, 506, 579 P.2d 505,
510, 146 Cal. Rptr. 614, 619 (1978).
22. CAL. CiV. PRoc. CODE § 877 (West 1980); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c)
(West Supp. 1985); American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578
P.2d at 915-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198-99. The California statutes providing for a good faith
settlement were specifically incorporated by the supreme court in American Motorcycle into
the context of partial indemnity. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at
599, 578 P.2d at 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
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from the amount the plaintiff may recover from the nonsettling joint
tortfeasors, 3 and the nonsettling joint tortfeasors must pay the bal-
ance of the plaintiff's judgment without any right to partial indem-
nity from the settling tortfeasor.""
The facts set forth above provide an example. Assume again
that plaintiff received injuries entitling him to damages in the
amount of $100,000 from defendant A who was ten percent at fault
and defendant B who was ninety percent at fault. Assume further
that before trial, defendant B settled with the plaintiff for $5,000. If
that settlement is found to be in good faith and the jury entered the
same judgment of $100,000 in the trial against nonsettling defendant
A, the $5,000 settlement would be subtracted from the amount that
plaintiff could recover from A. Under the rule of joint and several
liability, A would be required to pay the entire remaining $95,000 to
the plaintiff. However, A would have no claims for partial indemnity
to redistribute the loss back to B. Therefore, even though A was only
ten percent at fault, because of B's good faith settlement with the
plaintiff, A would end up paying $95,000 or ninety-five percent of
plaintiff's judgment and B would escape by paying only his settle-
ment amount of $5,000.
The calculation becomes a little more difficult if more than one
nonsettling joint tortfeasor is involved. In that situation, the shortfall
Section 877 provides:
Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to
sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judgment
to one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort:
(a) It shall not discharge any other such tortfeasor from liability unless its
terms so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount
stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the amount of the
consideration paid for it whichever is the greater; and
(b) It shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for
any contribution to any other tortfeasors.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980).
Section 877.6(c) provides:
A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith
shall bar any other joint tortfeasor from any further claims against the settling
tortfeasor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative in-
demnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.
CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 877.6(c) (West 1980).
23. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980); American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior
Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 603, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
24. Usually the tortfeasors cross-complain against each other for partial indemnity in
the original action. When one tortfeasor settles and his settlement is determined to be in good
faith, he then files motions for summary judgment to dismiss the partial indemnity cross-com-
plaints against him. If a tortfeasor has been sued by another tortfeasor for partial indemnity in
a separate action, he will similarly file a motion for summary judgment to dismiss that action.
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caused by a good faith settling joint tortfeasor must be shared among
the nonsettling joint tortfeasors in direct proportion to their respec-
tive degrees of fault.2"
The computation can be illustrated as follows. Assume that
plaintiff suffered $100,000 in damages as a result of the actions of
joint tortfeasors A, B and C, and that A was fifty percent at fault, B
was forty percent at fault and C was ten percent at fault. Assume
further that before trial, plaintiff settled with A for $40,000 and that
at a pretrial hearing the court found this to be a good faith settle-
ment. Plaintiff then proceeded to trial against B and C and obtained
a judgment against both for $100,000.26 The amount of A's good
faith settlement would be subtracted from plaintiff's judgment so that
plaintiff could recover only $60,000 from B or C. Assume he col-
lected it from B. B could not redistribute any of the loss back to A
because A's good faith settlement has released A from any claims for
partial indemnity. However, B could maintain a suit for partial in-
demnity against C.
The issue then becomes how to allocate ultimate responsibility
as between B and C. Under the rule set forth above, each must bear
the loss according to his respective percentage of fault. Because B
was forty percent at fault and C was ten percent at fault their ratio
of fault is four-to-one or eighty percent to twenty percent. Therefore,
they share liability for the $60,000 paid to plaintiff according to this
same ratio. Accordingly, B would be ultimately responsible for eighty
percent of $60,000 or $48,000. Thus, in B's suit for partial indem-
nity against C, B is entitled to recover $12,000.27
25. Lyly & Sons Trucking Co. v. State, 147 Cal. App. 3d 353, 358, 195 Cal. Rptr. 116,
118 (1983). This method achieves the same result as if the settling tortfeasor had not been
involved in the accident.
26. The same rules would apply if plaintiff sued only B or only C and then either B or
C paid a portion of the judgment that was greater than his allocable share.
27. Another way to perform the computation is to look at the shortfall caused by the
settling defendant A. Under this method, one looks at plaintiff's total damage before subtrac-
tion of the settlement amount and computes the percentage attributable to each defendant. On
these facts, $50,000 is attributable to defendant A, $40,000 is attributable to defendant B, and
$10,000 is attributable to defendant C. However, defendant A paid $40,000 in settlement and
has been released for claims for partial indemnity. Therefore, his shortfall is $10,000. Thus,
defendants B and C share that shortfall in relation to their percentage of fault, or in a ratio of
4-to-I or 80% to 20%. Defendant B is, therefore, liable for $8,000 of the shortfall and defend-
ant C is liable for $2,000 of the shortfall. Accordingly, the total amount attributable to defend-
ant B is $48,000 ($40,000 attributable to his own percentage of fault and $8,000 attributable
to his percentage of A's shortfall). Similarly, defendant C's total share is $12,000 ($10,000
attributable to his own percentage of fault and $2,000 attributable to defendant A's shortfall).
In his suit for partial indemnity, B can recover $12,000 from C.
No amount of the settling tortfeasor's shortfall is redistributed back to a negligent plain-
1986]
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In summary, whenever a prejudgment settlement by one joint
tortfeasor is found to be in good faith, it increases the ultimate ex-
pense that must be borne by each nonsettling joint tortfeasor. Absent
a settlement, all defendants are liable in direct proportion to their
respective degrees of fault. By settling before judgment, one
tortfeasor may discharge his entire liability by contributing less than
his proportionate share, leaving the other joint tortfeasors saddled
with the entire judgment reduced only by the amount of the
settlement.
Therefore, whenever a plaintiff attempts to enter into a good
faith settlement with fewer than all of the joint tortfeasors, the set-
tling and nonsettling tortfeasors are clearly adverse parties.28 As il-
lustrated above, this results from the fact that the lower the amount
of the settlement, the higher the amount that must ultimately be paid
by the nonsettling joint tortfeasors. The nonsettling tortfeasors,
therefore, have a definite financial interest in both whether the settle-
ment is found to be in good faith and the amount of that settlement.
2. The Good Faith Settlement Hearing
The issue of good faith is usually decided in a pretrial hearing
pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 877.629
which allows a party to seek a court order to determine whether a
settlement or proposed settlement is in good fai'th. The hearing is
normally requested by a co-defendant who wishes to settle with the
plaintiff, although the plaintiff is sometimes the moving party. Un-
derstandably, the defendant seeks this determination so that he can
be assured that if he settles, he will be totally free from the litigation
by being released not only from plaintiff's claims but from claims for
partial indemnity by the other joint tortfeasors as well. Usually, the
defendant makes the finding that his proposed settlement is in good
faith a condition to his final execution of the settlement agreement,
and will not enter into the settlement absent this finding. Without it,
tiff. Lyly & Sons Trucking Co. v. State, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 358, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 118. Such
a rule seems to make sense. Assume a plaintiff suffers damages in the amount of $100,000 and
a jury would find him to be 50% at fault, defendant A 40% at fault, and defendant B 10% at
fault. If plaintiff did not settle, he could recover $50,000 from either A or B. Under the present
law, if he settled with defendant A before trial for $20,000, and that settlement was found to
be in good faith, he could still recover $30,000 from defendant B, giving plaintiff a total recov-
ery of $50,000. However, if a portion of the $20,000 shortfall attributable to the settlement
with defendant A could be reallocated back to the plaintiff, plaintiff would lose every incentive
to settle.
28. Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 809, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
29. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1985).
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his settlement would not accomplish the desired purpose of terminat-
ing his exposure because he would still be liable for partial
indemnity.
The nonsettling joint tortfeasors will object to the finding of
good faith if they think that the settlement amount is too low. The
nonsettling co-defendants do not want the settling defendant released
from liability for partial indemnity for a settlement price that is be-
low the settling defendant's "fair share" of proportionate liability for
plaintiff's harm, because the co-defendants are then liable for the
remaining amount of the plaintiff's damages without reimbursement
from the settlor.
Section 877.6 specifically provides for the determination of good
faith at a pretrial hearing. 0 In order that the issue can be resolved
as early in the litigation as possible, any petition for a writ of man-
date to review the trial court's decision is to be given expedited treat-
ment."1 Other portions of the statute provide that the hearing shall
be held on at least twenty days notice, 2 that the hearing shall be
held upon affidavits and counteraffidavits, or that the court may re-
ceive evidence in its discretion, 8 and that the burden of proof on the
issue of good faith is on the party who asserts the lack of good
faith.3 '
3. The Test of Good Faith
Because only a settlement that a court finds to be in good faith
will alter the amounts ultimately borne by the nonsettling joint
tortfeasors, the decision as to whether the settlement is in good faith
is crucial. It is this finding that triggers the release of the settling
tortfeasor from subsequent liability to his joint tortfeasors for partial
indemnity."5
As will be shown below, prior to the Tech-Bilt decision, the
appellate courts disagreed about the proper definition of good faith.
This difference of opinion stemmed from a basic argument concern-
ing which of two conflicting policies behind the good faith settlement
rule was more important: 1) the policy of encouragement of settle-
ments, or 2) the policy of equitable apportionment of loss among
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. For a complete discussion of the evolution of the definition of good faith and the
various tests used by the courts, see Roberts, supra note 17, at 853-81.
1986]
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joint tortfeasors.3 These two policies conflict with each other in the
good faith settlement context.
The goal of encouraging settlement is best accomplished by de-
fining good faith in such a manner as to uphold the greatest number
of settlements between a willing plaintiff and a willing settling de-
fendant. A defendant's desire for settlement is increased in relation to
how low he perceives the settlement figure to be as compared to the
amount for which he would be responsible if he did not settle.8 7 If a
defendant's proposed settlement with the plaintiff is not found to be
in good faith, he will be very reluctant to settle with the plaintiff
because that settlement will not completely remove him from the
case."8 Therefore, settlements are encouraged by finding that an even
36. The policy considerations that must be considered in formulating a definition of a
good faith settlement are discussed in Roberts, supra note 17, at 882-98. For a discussion of
the way courts have dealt with these policies, see id. at 899-904.
37. Roberts, supra note 17, at 896.
38. The court in Torres v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 505 n.2, 203
Cal. Rptr. 825, 829 n.2 (1984), opined that this point has been overemphasized.
A settling defendant undoubtedly desires to 'close his books on a case' and
may well fear subsequent liability to his nonsettling co-defendants. We doubt,
however, that this fear will often cause the defendant to eschew a favorable
settlement with the plaintiff. After all, the plaintiff's claim poses the greatest
and most immediate threat to the defendant; liability to co-defendants is more
remote and contingent. Most defendants will be eager to rid themselves of the
immediate threat from plaintiff, even if this threat is thereby replaced with the
less likely prospect of liability to a co-defendant.
Id.
The position of the Torres court seems somewhat unrealistic. While liability to a co-
defendant may be more remote and contingent than liability to a plaintiff, most rational de-
fendants will not be willing to pay a substantial sum of money to settle a case with the plain-
tiff, only to have to face liability later to a co-defendant who is seeking to apportion damages.
This would place a settling defendant in a very precarious position because he must choose
whether to appear in the initial trial of the plaintiff's claims against the remaining co-defend-
ants in order to protect his position on the issues pertaining to plaintiff's total damages and the
various parties' negligence, or to simply sit back and attempt to defend his position on a co-
defendant's claim for partial indemnity. In either event, his litigation expenses will be the same
as if he had not settled with the plaintiff, and his risk of liability may not have diminished
much.
Of course, a very real possibility exists that the case will never go to trial against the
remaining co-defendants because they will subsequently settle with the plaintiff. Even so, un-
less the settlement between the plaintiff and the first settling defendant is found to be in good
faith, the subsequently settling co-defendants can sue the first defendant for partial indemnity
and force him to pay the percentage of the total settlement that is in accordance with his
percentage of fault. See Mill Valley Refuse Co. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 707, 166
Cal. Rptr. 687 (1980); American Bankers Ins. Co. v. Avco-Lycoming Div., 97 Cal. App. 3d
732, 159 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1979); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 82 Cal.
App. 3d 492, 147 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1978).
Therefore, practically speaking, a defendant will not settle with the plaintiff unless his
settlement has been found to be in good faith.
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disproportionately low settlement is in good faith.8 9
On the other hand, the second goal, that of equitable distribu-
tion of loss among tortfeasors, is defeated when a disproportionately
low settlement is found to be in good faith, and thereby leaves the
nonsettling tortfeasors to pay the remaining portion of plaintiff's
damages. Accordingly, in order to foster the policy of equitable dis-
tribution of loss according to fault, a definition of good faith should
be formulated so as to find in good faith only those settlements which
approximate the amount of the settlor's proportionate share of the
loss. 40
Therefore, the closer the definition of good faith moves toward
requiring the settlement to reflect the proportionality of the settlor's
fault, the more the policy of equitable apportionment of loss will be
fostered. However, correspondingly, the policy of encouragement of
at least initial settlements will be de-emphasized. Conversely, the
farther the definition of good faith moves away from requiring pro-
portionality, the more the policy of encouraging initial settlements
will be fostered. However, the policy of equitable apportionment of
loss will be correspondingly frustrated."1
a. The Tortious Conduct Test
Most California appellate courts prior to the supreme court de-
cision in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates"" used a
tortious conduct test to decide whether a settlement was in good
faith.48 This test resulted from the courts ranking the policy of en-
couragement of settlements ahead of the policy of equitable appor-
tionment of loss among tortfeasors. Courts applying this test carried
this ranking of goals to the extreme, and held that any settlement, no
matter how small, was impervious from attack by nonsettling joint
tortfeasors as long as it was made without tortious and wrongful
39. For an argument that approving a disproportionately low settlement as being in
good faith fosters only partial settlement of litigation rather than total settlement, see Roberts,
supra note 17, at 888-91.
40. Roberts, supra note 17, at 896.
41. Id. at 897.
42. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
43. See, e.g., Henderson v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 3d 297, 208 Cal. Rptr. 484
(1984); Ford Motor Co. v. Schultz, 147 Cal. App. 3d 941, 195 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1983); Wysong
& Miles Co. v. Western Indus. Movers, 143 Cal. App. 3d 278, 191 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1983);
Burlington N. R.R. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 186 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1982);
Cardio Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981);
Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981); Fisher v.
Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1980).
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intent.4 4
Under the tortious conduct test, the amount of the settlement
between the plaintiff and the settling defendant was irrelevant. "Bad
faith is not established by showing that a settling defendant paid less
that his theoretical proportionate or fair share of the value of plain-
tiff's case."
'4 5
Thus, a settlement so low that it bore no relationship whatso-
ever to the settling tortfeasor's probable ultimate liability under com-
parative fault principles did not amount to a bad faith settlement.
46
Instead, the only inquiry the court made under the tortious conduct
test was whether the settling parties engaged in tortious or other
wrongful conduct against the nonsettling joint tortfeasors. 7
The fact that such a settlement had the effect of injuring a non-
settling tortfeasor because it caused that party to face an exposure to
the plaintiff far in excess of his fair share of liability under compara-
tive fault principles did not make the settlement tortious. In fact,
such a result to the nonsettling tortfeasors was recognized.4" Under
the tortious conduct test, the settling parties were specifically allowed
"to further their respective interests without regard to the effect of
their settlement upon other defendants." 9
44. Ford Motor Co. v. Schultz, 147 Cal. App. 3d 941, 195 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1983);
Burlington N. R.R. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 187 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1982);
Cardio Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981).
45. Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 809, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44; see
also Burlington N. R.R. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 946, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
46. Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 238, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843, 847-
48 (1976).
47. Burlington N. R.R. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 945-46, 187 Cal. Rptr.
at 378; Cardio Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d at 890, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 260;
Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 809-10, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45.
48. "A settlement always removes the settling defendant from the action; this necessarily
results in a possibility that the remaining defendants will suffer judgment greater in amount
than if there had been no settlement." Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 809,
173 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
49. Id. at 809-10, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44. An example of how the tortious conduct test
works in practice can be found in the case of Cardio Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal.
App. 3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981). In that case, the plaintiffs were the widow and seven
children of a man who died during open heart surgery. The plaintiffs sued the hospital, several
doctors, and Cardio, who was the distributor and manufacturer of the heart lung pump ma-
chine that was a factor in the patient's death. The hospital filed a cross-complaint for partial
indemnity against Cardio. Before trial, the plaintiffs and Cardio entered into a settlement
whereby plaintiffs dismissed the complaint against Cardio with prejudice in exchange for
Cardio's waiver of costs. The hospital was forced to settle for an amount in excess of its
proportionate share of liability and then sought indemnity from Cardio. Cardio defended
against the hospital's cross-complaint for partial indemnity on the grounds that it had entered
into a good faith settlement and therefore was released from partial indemnity claims. The
appellate court agreed and held Cardio was released from liability on the cross-complaint.
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A plaintiff and defendant would rarely, if ever, settle for the
purpose of injuring a nonsettling joint tortfeasor, and only one court
has found such a situation.50 Thus, the tortious conduct test resulted
in virtually all settlements being found to be in good faith.5
All parties benefitted from this settlement except the nonsettling joint tortfeasor. The
plaintiffs benefitted as a matter of trial tactics. The plaintiffs' attorney testified that while he
felt there was a substantial case against Cardio, he had a straightforward uncomplicated case
against the hospital for the negligent act or omission of its employees in operating the heart
lung machine. Because the hospital had sufficient assets and sufficient insurance to pay the
judgment, he did not want to complicate a simple medical malpractice case when there was
clear liability by bringing in a complex products liability cause of action. Id. at 884-85, 176
Cal. Rptr. at 256-57. Clearly, Cardio also benefitted from this settlement. While plaintiff had
a substantial products liability action against Cardio, it was released from all liability for only
a waiver of costs. Under no circumstances was Cardio's waiver of costs reasonably proportion-
ate to Cardio's potential liability to the plaintiffs.
The party that was adversely affected by this settlement was, of course, the nonsettling co-
defendant hospital. Because Cardio and the plaintiff had acted consistently with the tortious
conduct test that a settlement is in good faith if the settling parties are merely acting to further
their own self interests, the settlement was found to be in good faith. Accordingly, the hospital
had no claim for partial indemnity against Cardio. The hospital, therefore, had to pay the full
amount of its settlement with the plaintiff without any claim for reimbursement at all against
Cardio even though Cardio was probably at least as much at fault as the hospital. For a
discussion of the appellate court's unhappiness with the Cardio decision see Roberts, supra
note 17, at 871.
50. An example of what constitutes collusion under the tortious conduct test can be
found in Henderson v. Superior Court, 162 Cal. App. 3d 297, 208 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1984). In
that case, the court found lack of good faith because the only possible motive for the settlement
was to insulate the settling tortfeasors from possible liability to the nonsettling defendant on a
cross-complaint. Id. at 300, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 486. In that case, plaintiff brought a personal
injury action arising out of an incident involving two gangs, and claimed that defendant in-
jured him with his automobile. The defendant, a member of one gang, cross-complained
against two members of the other gang who were the sister and close personal friend of the
plaintiff. Subsequently, the plaintiff agreed to settle with these cross-defendants for a total
payment of $18,000. The cross-defendants then instituted proceedings to find that their settle-
ment had been made in good faith, thus relieving them from any liability on the cross-com-
plaint for partial indemnity. The appellate court found collusion based on the relationship of
the settling parties and their animosity toward the nonsettling defendant, a member of a rival
gang. Because plaintiff had never suggested that he had any claim for damages against either
cross-defendant and did not name either of them as defendants, the only possible motive for the
settlement was to insulate these defendants from possible liability to the nonsettling defendant
on the cross-complaint. Thus, the court found the settlement was collusive and not in good
faith, thereby leaving the parties to litigate the issue of liability among themselves pursuant to
the nonsettling defendant's cross-complaint for partial indemnity.
51. Only three California appellate court cases have judged the good faith of a settle-
ment by a test other than the tortious conduct test. Two of the cases were the first two cases to
consider the meaning of a good faith settlement and were decided before the tortious conduct
test was established; River Garden Farms v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 498 (1972); and Lareau v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 783, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 837 (1975). The River Garden Farms court expressly rejected the absence of collusion
as the sole criterion of good faith. River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 103 Cal.
Rptr. at 505-06. Instead, under its test, a settlement would be in good faith if it fell within a
reasonable range of the settlor's fair share of the ultimate verdict to be received by the plaintiff.
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b. The Supreme Court Decision in Tech-Bit
In Tech-Bilt v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates,5 2 the California
Supreme Court laid down new rules for a good faith settlement and
disapproved the tortious conduct test under which the inquiry into
good faith was limited to whether the settlement was collusive,
fraudulent or dishonest. Under the new Tech-Bilt test, the price of
the settlement became an important factor. Good faith is now to be
determined by, among other things, whether the settling defendant is
paying his porportionate share of liability in the case.
i. The Role of the Good Faith Factor
The supreme court rejected the view of those courts applying
the tortious conduct test that the policy of encouragement of settle-
ments is primary and the policy of equitable apportionment of loss
must be sacrificed in order that settlements be encouraged. This ap-
Under this test, the price of the settlement was relevant. If the amount was too low and was
not within the reasonable range of the settlor's fair share of the plaintiff's predicted recovery,
the settlement would not be in good faith.
After River Garden Farms and Lareau, every appellate decision dealing with the defini-
tion of a good faith settlement adopted the tortious conduct test, with one notable exception,
Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984). To meet the test
of good faith, the Torres court held that the settlement figure could not be "grossly dispropor-
tionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling
defendant's liability to be." Id. at 509, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 832. The Torres court reasoned that
the more flexible standard "should discourage fraudulent or sham settlements, as well as settle-
ments which are unfair because they are simply 'too cheap,' " and, "should encourage defend-
ants, who really do wish to 'close the book' on a matter, to arrive at a settlement figure which
bears some relationship to what is fair." Id. a( 509, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
52. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985). The facts of Tech-Bilt are
as follows: The plaintiffs, owners of a residential property, brought an action against the de-
veloper (Tech-Bilt Construction Corporation), the soils engineers (Woodward-Clyde and Asso-
ciates), and others on various theories to recover for structural defects in their residence. Dur-
ing the early stages of the litigation it became apparent that plaintiffs' action against
Woodward-Clyde was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Woodward-Clyde's
counsel told plaintiffs' counsel that he would file a motion for summary judgment based on the
statute of limitations. Pursuant to this motion, Woodward-Clyde would have been able to
recover as costs its answer fee of $55. However, before the motion was filed, plaintiffs agreed
to dismiss the suit against Woodward-Clyde with prejudice in exchange for a waiver of costs.
Thereafter, Tech-Bilt, the nonsettling defendant, filed an amended cross-complaint for partial
indemnity and declaratory relief against Woodward-Clyde. Woodward-Clyde defended against
this action by seeking an order under CAL. CIV. Pnoc. CODE § 877.6 to confirm its agreement
with the plaintiff as a good faith settlement, and thus entitling it to summary judgment on
Tech-Bilt's cross-complaint. After a hearing, the trial court found the settlement to be in good
faith and entered summary judgment dismissing Tech-Bilt's cross-complaint against Wood-
ward-Clyde. Tech-Bilt appealed and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision
that the settlement was in good faith because the plaintiff and Woodward-Clyde had not in-
tended to tortiously injure Tech-Bilt by entering into their settlement.
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proach was too narrow because it completely abrogated the policy of
equitable apportionment of loss among joint tortfeasors. Instead, the
supreme court held that the requirement that a settlement be in good
faith should be applied to further both the policies of encouragement
of settlements and equitable allocation of loss among multiple
tortfeasors. Thus, the good faith requirement should be viewed as a
means to accommodate these competing but equally important
policies.5"
ii. The Reasonable Range Test
Armed with this view of the role of the good faith factor, the
supreme court adopted a test of a good faith settlement which, for
purposes of this article, will be referred to as the reasonable range
test. This test requires some amount of proportionality in order to
find a settlement to be in good faith. "A more appropriate definition
of 'good faith,' in keeping with the policies of American Motorcycle
and the statute, would enable the trial court to inquire, among other
things, whether the amount of the settlement is within the reasonable
range of the settling tortfeasor's proportional share of comparative
liability for plaintiff's injuries.""' The court identified eight separate
factors that should be taken into account in determining the good
faith of a settlement:55
1. A rough approximation of plaintiff's total recovery.
2. The settlor's proportionate liability.
3. The amount paid in settlement.
4. The allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs.
5. A recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than
he would if he were found liable after a trial.
6. The financial condition of the settling defendant.
7. The insurance policy limits of the settling defendant.
8. The existence of collusion, fraud or tortious conduct aimed to
injure the interests of nonsettling defendants."
The details of the reasonable range test are not clear. Beyond
the quotation and the factors set forth above, the supreme court did
not explain the test further. Most of the court's opinion concerned its
53. Roberts, supra note 17, at 902-03.
54. Tech-Bit, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166,
213 Cal. Rptr. at 263-64. This test was proposed in Roberts, supra note 17, at 917.
55. These factors are numbered for purposes of analysis in this article but were not
numbered by the court.
56. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 38 Cal. 3d at 499-500, 698 P.2d at
166-67, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263-64.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
reasons for adopting the reasonable range test, and it did not elabo-
rate on the specifics of the approach.
Some guidance as to the meaning of the reasonable range test
can be obtained from the case of River Garden Farms v. Superior
Court5 7 and a law review article entitled "The 'Good Faith' Settle-
ment: an Accommodation of Competing Goals."58 In adopting the
reasonable range test, the court relied extensively on both. Factors 1,
2, 3, and 5 above, derived from supreme court's opinion in Tech-Bilt,
are the same factors identified by the law review commentator and
the court in River Garden Farms as the factors to be utilized in
determining the reasonable range of a settlor's fair share of liability
for plaintiff's injuries.
The reasonable range test envisioned by those authorities did
not require strict proportionality, but rather that the settlement
amount be within a range of the settlor's proportionate share of
plaintiff's damages. 59 This range is to be established by the trial
judge's analysis of certain factors according to his expertise. The
analysis should operate with the trial judge: a) making a rough ap-
proximation of the amount plaintiff would recover after a trial; b)
approximating the amount of the settlor's proportionate liability
under comparative fault principles and thereby determining the set-
tlor's proportionate share of plaintiff's damages; c) reducing that fig-
ure by some amount as a recognition that a settlor should pay less in
settlement in advance of trial than he would if he were found liable
after trial; and d) comparing that resulting number to the amount of
the settlement.60 If the trial judge, in his discretion, finds that it is
close enough, then the settlement will be found to be in good faith.61
The reasonable range test asks not for precise numbers, but for an
approximation. As stated by the court in River Garden Farms, only
a rough assessment of value would be possible." Thus, a court does
not attempt to determine the precise amount of the parties' liability
and plaintiff's injuries, but rather makes rough approximations.
This type of reasonable range test which looks only to factors 1,
57. 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972).
58. Roberts, supra note 17.
59. River Garden Farms v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 103 Cal. Rptr. at
506; Roberts, supra note 17, at 917.
60. See Roberts, supra note 17, at 919-24.
61. Like the California Supreme Court, this author does not dare speculate on what
"close enough" would be. Such an unanswerable question can be carefully avoided by directing
the matter to the "sound discretion of the trial judge."
62. River Garden Farms v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 103 Cal. Rptr. at
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2, 3, and 5 of the Tech-Bilt test will be referred to as a "pure"
reasonable range test."3 Under this type of analysis, the policy of
equitable apportionment of loss is given true equal footing with the
policy of encouragement of settlements because only those settlements
objectively falling within a certain range qualify as a good faith set-
tlement. The peculiarities of the particular settling tortfeasor, includ-
ing, most importantly, his financial condition, are given no special
consideration and do not enter into the analysis."'
4. The Financial Resources of the Settling Defendant as a
New Factor of Good Faith
The supreme court in Tech-Bilt seemed to back off from a
"pure" reasonable range test and instead adopted a reasonable range
test in which the financial condition and insurance policy limits of
the settling joint tortfeasor are to be considered in determining
whether a settlement is in good faith. The court stated:
This is not to say that bad faith is "established by a showing
that a settling defendant paid less than his theoretical propor-
tionate or fair share." (citation omitted) Such a rule would un-
duly discourage settlement. "For the damages are often specula-
tive, and the probability of legal liability therefor is often
uncertain or remote. And even where the claimant's damages
are obviously great, and the liability therefor certain, a dispro-
portionately low settlement figure is often reasonable in the case
of a relatively insolvent, and uninsured, or underinsured, joint
tortfeasor.""
Among the eight factors listed by the court as bearing on the
good faith of a settlement are the financial condition and insurance
policy limits of the settling tortfeasor." Thus, the supreme court has
mandated that a tortfeasor may enter into a settlement for a lesser
amount, and that settlement will be in good faith, if this lower settle-
ment amount seems reasonable in light of his financial condition and
63. This was the test espoused by the commentator and relied on by the court. See
Roberts, supra note 17, at 917.
64. See Roberts, supra note 17, at 932-35.
65. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166,
213 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (citing Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d at 238, 132 Cal.
Rptr. at 847-48).
66. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 38 Cal. 3d at 499-501, 698 P.2d at
166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263. See also Barth-Wittmore Ins. Co. v. H.R. Murphy Enterprises,
Inc., 169 Cal. App. 3d 124, 134, 214 Cal. Rptr. 894, 899 (1985) (reaffirming that "Tech-Bilt
instructs the trial court to consider the financial condition and insurance policy limits of the
settling defendant."). Id.
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insurance policy limits.17
In fact, as a result of the Tech-Bilt case, financial condition may
prove to be the key factor in many good faith determinations. It is
likely that a tortfeasor wishing to settle will attempt to convince the
trial judge that his proposed settlement should be found to be in good
faith because it is a reasonable amount given his financial condi-
tion.6 8 Or, perhaps a settling joint, tortfeasor will first attempt to con-
vince a judge that his settlement is within the "pure" reasonable
range6 9 of his proportional share of comparative liability for the
plaintiff's injuries, and if unsuccessful, will then utilize the argument
that the settlement is reasonable because of his financial condition as
a fall back position. Therefore, the financial condition of the settling
joint tortfeasor will in all likelihood be a factor in many good faith
settlement hearings.
III. DISCOVERY OF THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE SET-
TLING JOINT TORTFEASOR
By including the financial condition of the settling joint
tortfeasor as one of the factors to be considered in determining
whether a settlement is in good faith, the supreme court has created
a new discovery problem-specifically, the discovery of the financial
condition of the settling joint tortfeasor.7 0 This problem was not pre-
sent under the old tortious conduct test of good faith7' and would not
67. The California Supreme Court made no further elaboration on exactly how the
financial condition of a settling defendant should affect the court's determination of good faith
in a particular case. Although beyond the scope of this article, an important issue which will
be faced by the trial courts in applying the Tech-Bilt reasonable range test will be to decide to
what extent the financial condition and insurance status of a settling defendant should figure in
the formula for a good faith settlement.
68. In one of the first appellate decisions after Tech-Bilt, the court looked to the finan-
cial condition of the settling tortfeasor. "[Alt the time of the settlement, [defendant] had little or
no income and was going out of business, so all that he had to salvage was what he had
personally." Barth-Wittmore Ins. Co. v. H.R. Murphy Enterprises, Inc., 169 Cal. App. 3d at
134, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900.
69. This article uses the term "pure" reasonable range test to refer to a test in which a
settlement is examined without reference to the settlor's financial condition or insurance policy
limits. See supra text accompanying notes 59-64.
70. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213
Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985). No unique discovery problems are created by the other criteria for a
good faith settlement set forth in Tech-Bilt. The other factors, such as the estimate of plaintiff's
damages and the estimate of the settlor's percentage of fault, involve information that is rou-
tinely discoverable as part of the underlying lawsuit itself.
71. Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981). See
infra text accompanying notes 145-51. For a discussion of the tortious conduct test, see supra
text accompanying notes 42-51.
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be present under a "pure" reasonable range test of good faith 2 be-
cause under those tests the financial condition of the settlor is not a
relevant factor. However, now that the settlor's financial condition is
relevant to the issue of good faith, the other parties will seek this
information through discovery.
The purpose of this section of the article is two-fold. First, it
points out the discovery dilemma created by the supreme court test
which makes the financial condition of a settlor a factor of good
faith. Second, this section suggests a resolution to this problem.
Because most cases regarding good faith settlements under Cali-
fornia law have and will take place in California state courts rather
than in federal courts," this article addresses itself primarily to Cali-
fornia procedural rules. The pertinent considerations would be the
same under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and reference will
be made to the appropriate federal cases and rules in the footnotes."4
A. General Rules Regarding Discovery of Another's Financial
Affairs
1. The Scope of Discovery
California's civil discovery act7 '6 provides for a broad range of
discovery." Discovery in civil litigation is permissible if the informa-
72. See infra text accompanying note 152. For a discussion of the "pure" reasonable
range test of good faith, see supra, text accompanying notes 63-64.
73. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would be applicable if the underlying action
was a diversity case in which the court was applying substantive California law on the issue of
the good faith of a settlement. Even though the state substantive law is applicable, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure would govern discovery disputes in federal court. McNeil Constr. Co.
v. Livingston State Bank, 185 F. Supp. 197, 201 (D. Mont. 1960), affid, 300 F.2d 88 (1962).
For an example of two cases that preceded Tech-Bilt in which the federal courts in a diversity
action applied California law on the issue of a good faith settlement, see Owen v. United
States, 713 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1983); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 640
F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
74. In fact, California courts quite often rely on federal precedent when construing the
California discovery provisions. California courts have ruled that, in enacting the discovery
statutes, the legislature must have intended that they should have the same meaning, force, and
effect as have been given the federal rules by the federal courts. Crummer v. Beeler, 185 Cal.
App. 2d 851, 8 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1960); Gorman Rupp Indus., Inc. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.
App. 3d 28, 97 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1971). CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, DISCOVERY
PRACTICE 56 (1975). For example, in Danzig v. Superior Court, 87 Cal. App. 3d 604, 151
Cal. Rptr. 185 (1978), the court looked to federal precedent to determine the circumstances in
which interrogatories may be propounded to unnamed class members. See also Deyo v. Kil-
bourne, 84 Cal. App. 3d 771, 149 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1978), in which the court referred exten-
sively to federal precedent. CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CIVIL Dis-
COVERY PRACTICE 2-3 (Supp. 1985).
75. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2016-2037.9 (West 1983).
76. Broad discovery is also the rule in federal practice. See FED. R. Crv. P. 26-37.
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tion sought: a) is not privileged; and b) is either relevant to the sub-
ject matter of the action, or is reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence." This standard is applied liberally
and discovery statutes are broadly construed with all doubts resolved
in favor of allowing discovery. 78 Information is generally discovera-
ble if it relates to a claim or assertion being made by the person from
whom the information is sought. 9
The principle of broad discovery is based on public policy con-
siderations. The public purpose served is that of effective judicial
dispute resolution8" and "the historically important state interest of
facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal
proceedings."'
2. Relevancy of Financial Condition Under the Discovery
Statutes
In the ordinary action for compensatory damages, the plaintiff
is not entitled to discovery of the defendant's financial condition.8"
Evidence regarding the defendant's financial status is generally not
only inadmissible, 8 but such information is also not relevant to the
77. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2016(b) (West 1983); see, e.g., Valley Bank of Nevada v.
Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 655-56, 542 P.2d 977, 978, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553, 554 (1975);
Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 808, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 43-44; Willis v.
Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 277, 289, 169 Cal. Rptr. 301, 307-308 (1980).
The scope of discovery is the same under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 2016(b) is identical to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (West Supp. 1985) as far as the
scope of discovery is concerned.
78. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 161, 173, 465 P.2d 854, 862-
63, 84 Cal. Rptr. 718, 726-27 (1970); Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355,
377-78, 364 P.2d 266, 276, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 100 (1961); Dompeling v. Superior Court 117
Cal. App. 3d at 808, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
Liberal discovery is also the rule under FED. R. Csv. P. 26. Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389
F. Supp. 1348, 1350 (D. Hawaii 1975).
79. Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 808, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44; CON-
TINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CIVIL DISCOVERY PRACTICE § 1.30, 25
(1975).
80. Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 265, 273, 150 Cal. Rptr. 77, 81
(1978).
81. Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 857, 574 P.2d 756, 774, 143 Cal. Rptr.
695, 703 (1978); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 432, 467 P.2d 557, 568, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829,
840 (1970); Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 313, 316, 187 Cal. Rptr. 4, 6
(1982); Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. Superior Court, 119 Cal.
App. 3d 516, 525, 174 Cal. Rptr. 160, 164 (1981).
82. People v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 710, 713, 11 Cal. Rptr. 14, 16 (1973);
Doak v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. App. 2d 825, 833, 65 Cal. Rptr. 193, 198 (1968).
83. Coy v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 210, 222-23, 373 P.2d 457, 463, 23 Cal. Rptr.
393, 399 (1962).
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subject matter of the action and is not likely to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence. Thus, in the ordinary case when the only
possible relevance of a defendant's finances is to his ability to re-
spond in damages, the defendant's personal finances, as opposed to
the existence and amount of his liability insurance, is not
discoverable.8 4
However, once a party's financial condition becomes relevant to
an issue in the underlying lawsuit, his financial information is dis-
coverable.8" The most common example is a case in which punitive
damages are claimed. Because the extent of a defendant's assets is
relevant to the amount of punitive damages, if the court is convinced
punitive damages can be appropriate, the plaintiff can conduct dis-
covery into the net worth of the defendant.86
Financial condition can become relevant in other types of cases
as well. For example, in a proceeding to increase monthly child sup-
port payments, a court held that discovery was proper which sought
information as to whether the defendant had sources of income other
than those already disclosed and whether he was presently entitled to
draw upon those sources of income.8" Because the questions were
pertinent to the issue of his ability to pay increased child support,
the questions were relevant to the subject matter of the proceeding. 8
Another example of the type of case in which information re-
garding a party's financial affairs was discoverable is found in Mos-
84. Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 804, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 41; Doak
v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. App. 2d at 832-33, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 197-98.
85. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 553 (1975); Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 804, 173 Cal. Rptr. at
41; Willis v. Superior Court 112 Cal. App. 3d 277, 169 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1980).
86. Coy v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d at 222-23, 373 P.2d at 463, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
When punitive damages are alleged, no pretrial discovery is permitted by the plaintiff into the
defendant's financial condition unless the court first enters an order so allowing. The court will
issue such an order if plaintiff establishes that there is a substantial probability that it will
prevail on the claim for punitive damages. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295(c) (West Supp. 1985).
A similar rule establishing that when punitive damages are claimed, the defendant's fi-
nancial condition is relevant to the subject matter of the action and is thus a proper subject of
discovery, has also been adopted by the federal courts. Miller v. Doctors Gen. Hosp., 76
F.R.D. 136, 140 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii
1975).
87. De Mayo v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 2d 392, 393-94, 11 Cal. Rptr. 157, 158-
59 (1961).
88. Id. at 394, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 159. Similarly, in a proceeding to be relieved from the
payment of child support, a divorced husband was permitted to discover financial information
concerning the nature and extent of his prior wife's property. Chapin v. Superior Court, 239
Cal. App. 2d 851, 855-56, 49 Cal. Rptr. 199, 201-02 (1966). There, the husband was permit-
ted to make inquiry by discovery proceedings concerning both the separate and community
property of his prior wife arising from her second marriage.
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kowitz v. Superior Court. 9 There, plaintiff sued defendants for legal
malpractice and alleged that as a result of the malpractice, a judg-
ment was entered against him and he was unable to obtain a bond or
stay execution pending appeal from the judgment. Plaintiff asserted
that as a matter of financial survival and under threat of execution
against his assets he was compelled to pay a large settlement in satis-
faction of the judgment. Because plaintiff "put in issue" his financial
condition by asserting that he had insufficient financial resources to
stay execution of the judgment entered against him, discovery of his
financial condition was proper.9"
3. The Right of Privacy as a Limitation on Discovery of Fi-
nancial Information
A competing consideration regarding the discovery of another's
financial affairs is that person's right of privacy. In 1974, the right of
privacy became an "inalienable right" under the California Consti-
tution.91 This elevated to a state constitutional dimension the right of
privacy which had been enunicated in several prior decisions."2 The
89. 137 Cal. App. 3d 313, 187 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1982).
90. Id. at 317-18, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 7-8. In Moskowitz, the plaintiff did not seek to
restrict the scope of discovery nor did he deny that the defendants were entitled to discover the
details of his financial affairs. Rather, plaintiff sought to prevent disclosure of his personal
financial information to persons who had no legitimate interest in its use for purposes of the
litigation. Id. at 316, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 6-7.
91. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. CAL. CoNs'r. art. I § 1, provides: "All people are by nature
free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life
and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety,
happiness, and privacy." Id.
92. The right of privacy was given its first major judicial formulation by the United
States Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). The court
found the right of privacy within the "penumbras" or "emanations" of the rights enumerated
in the Bill of Rights. Smith, The Right of Privacy as a Restriction on Discovery, 5 Csv. LIT.
R. 117 (1983).
Even before the California constitutional amendment, the California Supreme Court
found the right of privacy barred compelled disclosure of a public official's personal invest-
ments, City of Carmel by the Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1970), and the psychiatric history of a party, In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85
Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970). Smith, supra note 92, at 117.
The right of privacy set forth in the California Constitution is broader than the federal
right of privacy recognized as a penumbral right emanating from the U.S. Constitution as set
forth in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d
757, 774-75, 533 P.2d 222, 233-34, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 104-06 (1975); Hall, Pretrial Discov-
ery of Net Worth in Punitive Damages Cases, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1143 n.20 (1981).
Under federal discovery procedure, the right of privacy is also recognized. Seattle Times
Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 n.21 (1984); Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp.
1348, 1350 (D. Hawaii 1975); United Air Lines, Inc. v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213, 219
n.9 (D. Del. 1960). Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 46 F.R.D. 605, 607 (D.D.C. 1969). The
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right of privacy is a "fundamental interest" of our society,
"[e]ssential to [those] rights guaranteed by the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the United States Constitution." '
As stated by one court of appeal:
The right of privacy now incorporated expressly in article I,
section 1 of the California Constitution exists to prevent govern-
mental 'snooping,' to inhibit the overly broad collection and re-
tention of unnecessary personal information, the improper use
of information properly obtained for a specific purpose, and to
avoid the evils incident to lack of a reasonable check on the ac-
curacy of existing records.9
Among the classes of information entitled to protection under
the right of privacy is personal financial information.9" Thus, the
Supreme Court in Seattle Times Co. stated that discovery may seriously implicate privacy
interests of litigants and third parties. Although FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) contains no specific
reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that may be implicated, such matters are
implicit in the broad purpose and language of the Rule. Seattle Times Co., 104 S. Ct. 2199,
2208 n.21.
93. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 130, 610 P.2d 436, 439, 164
Cal. Rptr. 539, 542 (1980); White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 774-75, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal.
Rptr. at 105-06; Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. Superior Court,
119 Cal. App. 3d at 524-25, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 163-64.
94. Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d at 273, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
95. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d at 656, 542 P.2d at 979, 125
Cal. Rptr. at 555; Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 315, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 6;
Cobb v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d at 549, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 565; Richards v. Superior
Court, 36 Cal. App. 3d at 273, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
The right of privacy in the form of the right to keep confidential one's financial affairs is
well recognized by the federal courts as well. Corbett v. Free Press Ass'n, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 179,
180 (D. Vt. 1970); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 46 F.R.D. 605, 607 (D.D.C. 1969); Vollert v.
Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (D. Hawaii 1975).
It is not clear whether the financial information of business or corporations is protected by
the right of privacy. In GT, Inc. v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 748, 198 Cal. Rpt. 892 (1984),
the court issued a protective order to safeguard the financial information of a business entity.
In Cobb v. Superior Court, the court did not deem it necessary to consider this issue. 99 Cal.
App. 3d at 547 n.3, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 564 n.3. However, as stated in that case, if a business or
corporation is claiming that it does not have sufficient assets to pay for its share of plaintiff's
damages, then, in all likelihood, allegations of piercing the corporate veil and alter ego will be
made which may result in the necessity of delving into the defendant's personal financial
information.
The federal courts have applied the right of privacy to the financial affairs of businesses.
Corbett v. Free Press Ass'n, 50 F.R.D. 179, 180 (D.Vt. 1970). A federal case which refused to
allow a "fishing expedition in the waters of defendant's finances" did not provide any less
protection to the financial affairs of a corporation than it would to the financial affairs of an
individual. Board of Educ. v. Borg, Inc., 104 F.R.D. 23, 32-34 (N.D. IIl. 1984).
Among the other classes of information which have been held to be protected by the right
of privacy are: Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 574 P.2d 766, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695
(1978) (medical history not "directly relevant" to the injury at issue); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal.
3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970) (psychiatric history); Britt v. Superior Court,
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right of privacy entitles a party to be protected from harassment and
intrusion into his financial affairs.96
4. Balancing The Interests Through Protective Orders
With respect to the discovery of personal financial information,
a conflict exists between the two above-mentioned public policies: a)
the policy of broad discovery to facilitate the ascertainment of truth;
and b) the policy of protecting the right of privacy of the person
from whom the discovery is sought.97 The court has basically three
choices in dealing with this conflict."'
The first option is to deny discovery altogether because any
forced disclosure of financial information infringes on the right of
privacy. However, while a complete ban on discovery would protect
the one party's confidentiality, it also deprives his adversary of infor-
mation necessary to the preparation of his case. Such an approach
exacts a severe price for the protection of privacy and undermines
the policy of liberal discovery when the requested information is rel-
evant to the subject matter of the action. When possible, the courts
prefer to impose partial restrictions rather than an outright denial of
discovery.99
Therefore, the courts have not chosen this option of completely
precluding the discovery of the financial information. Rather, they
have held that the constitutional right of privacy is not absolute and
may be abridged to accommodate a compelling public interest.100
One such interest is the previously mentioned important state inter-
est of facilitating the ascertainment of truth in connection with legal
20 Cal. 3d 844, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695 (1978) (associational privacy); Morales v. Superior Court,
99 Cal. App. 3d 283, 160 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1979) (sexual relations); People v. Doyle, 77 Cal.
App. 3d 126, 141 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1977) (client files in an attorney's office); Board of Trustees
of Leland Stanford Junior University v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 516, 174 Cal. Rptr.
160 (1981) (personel records); Smith, supra note 92, at 119-20. See also, Matzger, Discovery
and the Right of Privacy, April 1980, BRIEFCASE 11, 14.
96. Cobb v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d at 549, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
97. Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 316, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
98. Comment, Protective Orders Prohibiting Dissemination of Discovery Information:
The First Amendment and Good Cause, 1980 DUKE L.J. 766, 769-71, 771 n.28.
99. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Suprior Court, 15 Cal. 3d at 657-58, 542 P.2d at 979-80,
125 Cal. Rptr. at 555-56; Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d at 383, 364 P.2d at
280, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
100. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 131, 610 P.2d 436, 440, 164
Cal. Rptr. 539, 543 (1980); Loder v. Municipal Court, 17 Cal. 3d 859, 864, 553 P.2d 624,
628, 132 Cal. Rptr. 464, 468 (1976); White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775, 533 P.2d 222, 234,
120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 106 (1975); Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 316, 187
Cal. Rptr. at 6; Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d at 273, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
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proceedings which is evidenced by California's broad discovery stat-
utes.' " Thus, even though personal financial information falls
within the zone of privacy protected by article 1, section 1 of the
California Constitution, discovery of such information cannot be
completely denied if the information sought is relevant to the subject
matter in issue, 02 i.e., it is otherwise discoverable.
The court's second alternative is to allow unrestrained discovery
of financial information. It could order the discovery without any
limitation and thereby allow the discovering party to use the discov-
ered information as he wishes.'0 This could harm the producing
party if the discovering party disseminates the information or uses it
for some purpose other than discovery.10" Such an approach is also
harsh because while the information gathering purpose of discovery
is effectuated, the unrestrained use of the information is not neces-
sary to achieve that purpose. The right of privacy, while not abso-
lute, requires certain restrictions on the discovery of financial infor-
mation.' 5 Accordingly, the courts have also rejected this alternative.
Instead, the courts have adopted a middle position which seeks
to accommodate the competing interests of the individual's right of
privacy of his financial affairs and the public's need for discovery in
litigation.' 6 This is accomplished by the issuance of an appropriate
protective order in each case.' 07 Thus, the court will allow the re-
quested discovery, thereby satisfying the policy of truth ascertain-
ment. However, the court will also fashion a protective order to min-
101. Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 857, 574 P.2d at 774, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
102. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d at 656-658, 542 P.2d at 978-
80, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 554-56; Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 808, 173
Cal. Rptr. at 43-44; Willis v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d at 297, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 312;
Cobb v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d at 549, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
103. See Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 18 F.R.D. 503, 508 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
104. See infra text accompanying note 171.
105. See infra text accompanying notes 109-111.
106. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d at 657, 342 P.2d at 979, 125
Cal. Rptr. at 555; Moskovitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 316, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 6;
Cobb v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d at 549, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 565.
The federal courts also utilize a balancing approach to determine what type of discovery
is appropriate. This approach requires a balancing of plaintiff's need for the information and
the possible prejudice to defendant if discovery is allowed. Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F.
Supp. at 1351; Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc. 46 F.R.D. at 607; United Airlines, Inc. v. United
States, 26 F.R.D. 213, 219 (D. Del. 1960).
107. Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 319, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 8; Mar-
tin v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 395, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 813; Cobb v. Superior
Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d at 550, 160 cal. Rptr. at 566; Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal.
App. 3d at 273, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
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imize the harm to the producing party from the use or release of the
confidential information.1"8 In this way, the inevitable invasion of
privacy can be kept within constitutionally permissible limits. The
compelled disclosure must be permitted only to the extent necessary
for a fair resolution of the lawsuit.' 09 "The scope of disclosure [must]
be narrowly circumscribed" 0 and the protective order must be care-
fully crafted "with narrow specificity." 11
Protective orders, which are authorized by statute for both
state 12 and federal procedure, 1 8 seem to be the best alternative in
108. Cobb v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d at 550, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 566; Richards
v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d at 273, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
109. Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 859, 574 P.2d at 775, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 704;
Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 316, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 6; City and County
of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. App. 3d 879, 883, 178 Cal. Rptr. 435, 437
(1981).
110. Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 316, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
111. Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 856, 574 P.2d at 773, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 702
(citing Vogel v. City of Los Angeles, 68 Cal. 2d 18, 22, 434 P.2d 961, 963, 64 Cal. Rptr. 409,
411 (1967)); Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 316, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 6; City
and county of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. App. 3d at 883, 178 Cal. Rptr. at
437.
112. CAL. CIV. PRoC. CODE § 2019(b)(1) (West 1983) provides that on noticed motion,
or on the court's own motion with opportunity for counsel to be heard, and in either case for
good cause shown, the court may make any of the following orders:
(a) "that the deposition shall not be taken";
(b) "that it may be taken only at some designated time or place other than
stated in the notice";
(c) "that the deposition may be taken beyond the ordinary distance limitations";
(d) "that it shall not be taken except by allowing written interrogatories by one
or more parties";
(e) "that certain matters shall not be inquired into";
(0 "that the scope of the examination shall be limited to certain matters";
(g) "that the examination shall be held with no one present except the parties
to the action and their officers or counsel";
(h) "that after being sealed the deposition shall be opened only by order of the
court, or that secret processes, developments, or research need not be disclosed,
or that the parties shall simultaneously file specified documents or information
enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court";
(i) "any other order which justice requires to protect the party or witness from
annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression."
Id.
The enumerated orders set forth in CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2019(b)(1) include most
contingencies requiring protection which are apt to occur. Nevertheless, this section, substan-
tially like its federal counterpart, provides generally that the court "may make any order
which justice requires to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or op-
pression." See Louisell, Discovery Today, 45 CAL. L. REV. 486, 512 (1957).
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2019(b)(1), by its terms, deals only with the taking of oral
depositions, but it is specifically made applicable to other types of discovery such as written
interrogatories (CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 2030(b) (West 1983)); depositions upon written
interrogatories (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2020(d) (West 1983)); and requests for admissions
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this discovery dilemma. Such orders are in fact frequently used by
both state and federal courts to facilitate discovery while protecting
the confidentiality of the information obtained.114
a. Common Types of Protective Orders Under Which Fi-
nancial Information is Sought
The courts have in the past fashioned certain types of protective
orders to accommodate considerations of both disclosure and confi-
dentiality. For example, Richards v. Superior Court,"' Cobb v. Su-
perior Court,"" and Martin v. Superior Court"7 involved lawsuits
(CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2033(a) (West 1983)). While not specifically applicable to inspec-
tion of documents and things (CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2031(a) (West 1983)), § 2019(b)(1) is
relevant to these proceedings because the relevancy provisions of CAL. Civ. Ptoc CODE §
2016(b) apply in determining the scope of discovery under CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 2031,
and CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 2019(b) applies in determining the scope of discovery permissi-
ble under § 2016(b). Without discussing the issue, the court in GT, Inc. v. Superior Court,
151 Cal. App. 3d 748, 198 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1984) applied CAL. CIV. Pioc. CODE § 2019(b) to
a request for production of documents. The discovery provision dealing with physical and
mental examinations, (CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2032 (West 1983)), while not incorporating §
2019(b), provides that the court shall specify the "time, place, manner, conditions and scope"
of the examination.
113. Protective orders are authorized under the Federal Rules of Civil P. FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(c) allows the court, for good reason, to make any order which justice requires to protect
against annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or
more of the following:
(I) that the discovery not be had:
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions, in-
cluding a designation of the time or place:
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that
selected by the party seeking discovery:
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery
be limited to certain matters;
(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated
by the court;
(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court;
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commer-
cial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way;
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information en-
closed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
This list of eight types of protective orders is not exclusive. A court may fashion other
appropriate orders to achieve the purposes of the rule. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CiV. § 2036, at 269 (1970).
114. Comment, Protective Orders Prohibiting Dissemination of Discovery Information:
The First Amendment and Good Cause, 1980 DUKE L.J. 766, 769-71, 771 n.28. See cases
cited in supra notes 106-109.
115. 86 Cal. App. 3d 265, 150 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1978).
116. 99 Cal. App. 3d 543, 160 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1979).
117. 110 Cal. App. 3d 391, 167 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1980).
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in which punitive damages were alleged. The courts of appeal ac-
knowledged the relevance of the defendants' financial condition to
the issue of punitive damages but fashioned protective orders to pro-
tect the defendants' right of privacy as much as possible." 8 In Rich-
ards, the plaintiff sought documents pertaining to the personal earn-
ings and net worth of law partners who were being sued for
malpractice. The court of appeal ordered the disclosure but issued a
protective order which limited disclosure of the financial information
to counsel for the plaintiff or to that counsel's representative, and not
to plaintiff himself."' The court also prohibited the use of the infor-
mation for purposes other than the lawsuit.'2
In Cobb, the court stated that the Richards-type protective or-
118. In 1980, the legislature added CAt.. CIv. CODE § 3295(c) preventing pretrial dis-
covery of financial condition on the issue of punitive damages without a court order. See supra
note 86. If the court does grant such discovery, a protective order such as those set forth by the
courts in Richards v. Superior Court and related cases and described infra text accompanying
notes 115-130, would still be appropriate. DEMEo, CALIFORNIA DEPOSITION AND Discov-
ERY PRACTICE 5.11(12).
119. A limitation on the disclosure of discovery material to the discovering party's coun-
sel for the pending litigation has been used in the federal courts in trade secret cases. Liberty
Folder v. Curtiss Anthony Corp., 90 F.R.D. 80 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Sun-
beam Corp., 61 F.R.D. 598 (D. Del. 1973); Struthers Scientific and International Corp. v.
General Foods Corp., 45 F.R.D. 375 (S.D. Tex. 1968). This restriction has also been applied
to prevent disclosure of financial records concerning loan agreements, merger talks and records
concerning privately financed research. Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 21
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). For a discussion of possible first amendment problems associated with such
an order, see infra note 128.
120. Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d at 272, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 81. The
court in Richards specifically held that:
[W]here a party is compelled in civil discovery to reveal financial information
because the information is relevant to the subject matter of a claim for punitive
damages, that party is upon his motion, presumptively entitled to a protective
order that the information need be revealed only to counsel for the discovering
party or to the counsel's representative, and that once so revealed, the informa-
tion may be used only for purposes of the lawsuit. The burden is upon the
opposing party to establish a substantial reason why the order should be denied.
That reason must be related to the lawsuit.
Id. The federal courts have also held that a party's interest in nondisclosure can be protected
by limiting the adverse party's use of the discovered information and prohibiting disclosure of
the information beyond the confines of the case. Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1348,
1352 (D. Hawaii 1975). A court may issue a protective order limiting the disclosure of the
requested information under FED. R. CIv. PROc. 26(c). The provisions of this rule give the
court broad power to control the use of the discovery process, and the exercise of this power is
in the sound discretion of the court. Corbett v. Free Press Ass'n, 50 F.R.D. 179, 181 (D. Vt.
1970); Textured Yarn Co. v. Burkart-Schier Chem. Co., 41 F.R.D. 158 (E.D. Tenn. 1966);
Colonial Capital Co. v. General Motors Corp., 29 F.R.D. 514 (D. Conn. 1961); Rose Silk
Mills v. Insurance Co. of North America, 29 F. Supp. 504, (S.D.N.Y. 1939). For a discussion
of possible first amendment problems associated with such an order, see infra note 128.
JOINT TORTFEASOR CONFIDENTIALITY
der was not the only method to achieve the necessary protection, 1'
and suggested certain illustrative guidelines to be considered in bal-
ancing financial disclosure demands against an objection based on
the right of privacy.' 22 Among the factors listed by the court in Cobb
were delaying the timing of the discovery, sealing the information,
and restrictions on the access to the information once disclosed. Spe-
cifically, the court indicated that it was not necessary for the litigant
to have access to the information, but that access by his attorney
would be sufficient.' 23 As far as timing was concerned, the Cobb
court held that in the punitive damages context it is seldom necessary
for a court to permit discovery into a defendant's financial affairs
before discovery on the merits of the underlying cause of action, 24
and suggested delaying disclosure until near trial.'25
In Martin, the attempted discovery of financial information was
via interrogatories, and the trial court issued a protective order that
the financial information be sealed upon filing with the court, that
the information be used only in connection with the present litiga-
tion, and that the information could be disseminated only to the par-
ties and their counsel.' 26 The court of appeal held this protective
order was not adequate" 7 in that the order allowed dissemination of
the financial information to the parties, as opposed to their counsel
only. The court, therefore, issued a writ of mandate directing the
trial court to enter a new order limiting access to counsel only.'2 8
121. Cobb v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d at 549, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 563.
122. Id. The court emphasized that these guidelines were suggestions intended to illus-
trate the types of variables the court should consider in trying to achieve a balance of interests.
Id. at 551-52, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 566-67.
123. Id. at 551, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
124. Id. at 550-51, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
125. Id. The postponement of discovery until near the trial date in order that the rele-
vancy of the information sought can be seen more clearly is also present in the federal system.
See Note, Protective Orders Restricting Disclosure of Discovery in Federal Civil Proceedings
56 CHICAGO KENT L. REV. 943, 957 n.1 10 (1980).
126. Martin v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 393-94, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
127. Id. at 394, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
128. Id. at 395, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
In the past, litigants have argued that a protective order limiting the dissemination of
information gained in discovery violated the discovering party's first amendment rights. Al-
though most courts found no constitutional problems with the granting of a protective order
forbidding the publicizing of information obtained through discovery, Rodgers v. United States
Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001 (3rd Cir. 1976); International Prod. Corp. v. Koons,325 F.2d 403
(2nd Cir. 1963), at least one court recognized a litigant's first amendment right to disclose such
information. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
However, this issue now seems to have been laid to rest by the U. S. Supreme Court in
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984). There, the Supreme Court upheld a
Washington state trial court's order preventing defendants from publicly disseminating certain
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While illustrative, these types of protective orders are not exclu-
sive. Ingenious courts and counsel may develop other approaches,' 2 9
and the trial judge has broad discretion in formulating an appropri-
ate protective order."'
b. Burden of Proof in Protective Order Proceedings
The appellate courts disagree about who has the burden of
proof in a proceeding to obtain a protective order in which the finan-
cial information sought is relevant to the merits of the underlying
information derived from discovery. The state court reasoned that such an order reasonably
protects a legitimate interest in privacy and does not offend the first amendment. In that case,
the defendant newspaper sought and obtained linancial and membership data about a religious
sect of which plaintiff was the leader. Although the case involved a Washington state statute,
that statute is similar to both FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) and CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2019(b)(1).
With respect to California state court practice, no California court has found any first
amendment problems with a protective order limiting the dissemination of discovery informa-
tion. In fact, the first amendment argument was made and rejected in Moskowitz v. Superior
Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 319, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
Real parties argue that the order of respondent court denying petitioner's mo-
tion for a protective order is supported by the principle that First Amendment
rights extend to the fruits of discovery. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 187 (D.C.
Cir. 1979); Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 83 F.R.D. 471, 475 (S.D.N.Y.
1982), The contention lacks merit. As the court acknowledges in Halkin, supra,
'the First Amendment is not an absolute [citation omitted], and the protection
afforded the exercise of First Amendment rights may be limited in certain nar-
row circumstances.' (598 F.2d at p. 190) . . . . In any event, it has been held
that while the First Amendment precludes restriction of the use of information
obtained independently of court processes, there is no such constitutional prohi-
bition against an order which forbids the publicization of information obtained
through the discovery process.
Id.
See also Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001, 1006-1007 (3d Cir. 1976).
129. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.3d at 658, 542 P.2d at 980, 125
Cal.Rptr. at 556.
130. Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.2d at 380-84, 364 P.2d at 277-80, 15
Cal. Rptr. at 101-04; Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 317, 187 Cal. Rptr.
at 7; Cobb v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d at 551, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 567.
The U.S. Supreme Court has reaffirmed the trial judge's broad discretion in issuing a
protective order. Citing Judge Friendly in International Prod. Co. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403,
407-08 (2nd Cir. 1963), the Court stated:
"[Whether or not the Rule itself authorizes [a particular protective order] ...
we have no question as to the court's jurisdiction to [issue it) under the inherent
'equitable powers of courts of law over their own process to prevent abuses,
oppression, and injustices.' " The unique character of the discovery process al-
lowing liberal pretrial discovery requires that the trial court have substantial
latitude to fashion protective orders.
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. at 2208.
See also Textured Yarn Co. v. Burkart-Schier Chemical Co., 41 F.R.D. 158 (E.D. Tenn.
1966).
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cause of action asserted in the litigation as opposed to a claim for
punitive damages. In Richards, a punitive damages case, the court
held that the defendants were "presumptively entitled" to the type of
protective order given in that case."' 1 The burden of proof is on the
party seeking the financial information to establish a reason, related
to the lawsuit, for denial of the protective order."'
The court in Moskowitz v. Superior Court took this holding one
step further and applied the same presumption in favor of a protec-
tive order to a non-punitive damages case."' In Moskowitz, the fi-
nancial information sought related to the main cause of action itself,
and the party seeking the protective order was a plaintiff, not a de-
fendant. The plaintiff was suing his former attorney for malpractice,
and alleged he was damaged because he was unable to obtain a bond
to stay execution of judgment pending appeal and was therefore
compelled to pay $1.75 million to settle the case. The parties agreed
that the plaintiff's financial condition was discoverable and that the
only issue involved was plaintiff's entitlement to a protective order
limiting the disclosure of the information by the defendant's attor-
neys. The court of appeal held that under Richards, the plaintiff
was presumptively entitled to a protective order and that the defend-
ant had failed to rebut the presumption. 34 The court concluded that
the presumption of entitlement to a protective order applies even
when plaintiff himself put his financial condition in issue. 5
However in GT, Inc. v. Superior Court,1"6 another non-puni-
tive damages case, the court disapproved of Moskowitz and distin-
guished Richards and Cobb. The court stated that when the finan-
cial information directly relates to the cause of action itself'"" (as
opposed to a claim for punitive damages) there will often be a legiti-
131. 86 Cal. App. 3d at 272, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
132. Id. at 272. The same rule was adopted in Martin v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App.
3d at 395, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
133. 137 Cal. App. 3d at 318, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
134. Id. at 317-18, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 7-8.
135. Id. at 318, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
136. 151 Cal. App. 3d 748, 198 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1984).
137. GT involved an action between two publishers on issues of antitrust and unfair
competition arising from alleged underpriced advertising by defendant. Plaintiff sought discov-
ery of certain documents of defendant containing financial information relating to the cause of
action. The specific discovery question involved a request from plaintiff to defendant to identify
each financial statement, profit and loss statement, balance sheet, financial projection docu-
ment, and general ledger for the past five years for both the newspaper and the direct-mail
shopper. The trial court imposed a protective order which specified that the documents ob-
tained be produced to plaintiff's counsel and accountants only and not to plaintiff himself. The
appellate court upheld the protective order granted by the trial court because it found there
was good cause for the protective order because of the animosity between the parties. Id.
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mate need for the information to be disclosed to the opposing party
himself rather than only to his attorney in order that the litigant can
help prepare his case.1"8 This is to be distinguished from the puni-
tive damages situation in which the client has little need to know of
the information when preparing his case on the liability question. 3'
Therefore, the GT court held that Moskowitz notwithstanding, the
presumption in favor of the issuance of a protective order does not
apply to the situation where the financial information goes to the
heart of the cause of action itself rather than to a claim for punitive
damages. 40 Instead, the party seeking the protective order is re-
quired to meet the usual burden of showing "good cause" under
Code of Civil Procedure section 2019(b)(1). " " GT's holding that
there is no presumptive right to a protective order has been criticized
on the grounds that the constitutional right of privacy should take
precedence over the requirement of showing "good cause" under
Code of Civil Procedure section 2019(b)(1).1 42
B. Applying The Discovery Rules to The Good Faith Settlement
Context
The discoverability of the settling defendant's financial informa-
tion for purposes of a good faith settlement hearing is a novel issue
resulting from the California Supreme Court's decision in Tech-
138. GT, Inc. v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 754, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
139. In commenting on Moskowitz, the court in GT, Inc. v. Superior Court said that
whether Moskowitz was a warranted extension of Richards was impossible to assess because
the Moskowitz court failed to specify what kind of protective order was sought. The GT court
noted that if the protective order in Moskowitz sought only to limit disclosure to those involved
in the lawsuit, a presumption in plaintiff's favor would seem appropriate. However, if the
order sought to prevent defendants themselves from examining the financial information, ap-
plication of the Richards presumption may have been improper. Id. at 754, 198 Cal. Rptr. at
895-96.
140. Id.
141. CAL. Csv. PROC. CODE § 2019(b)(1) (West 1983) provides, inter alia that a court
may "for good cause shown" make any order "which justice requires to protect the party or
witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression."
142. Civ. Lnr. R. 80-81 (CEB 1984). The author argued that,
As for the GT court's insistence on a finding of 'good cause' for a right-of-
privacy protective order, there seems no more reason to require such a showing
in civil discovery of personal financial data than there would be to require a
'good cause' finding to bar from a criminal proceeding evidence obiained by an
illegal search or by coercion. Both the right of privacy and the prohibitions
against unreasonable searches and self-incrimination are of constitutional di-
mension, require no legislative implementation, and spring from common citizen
concerns. In sum, the reasoning of the court in GT seems unsound.
Id. at 81.
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Bilt."' The courts have never before dealt with this discovery issue
under a test of good faith which includes the financial condition of
the settling defendant as a relevant factor.' 44
1. Discoverability Under Tests of Good Faith Other Than
That Set Forth in Tech-Bilt
a. Discovery of Financial Condition Under the Tor-
tious Conduct Test
The tortious conduct test created no problems as far as discov-
ery of the net worth of the settling tortfeasor was concerned. Because
the amount of a settlement was irrelevant under the tortious conduct
test, ' 45 it followed that the financial condition of the settling joint
tortfeasor was also irrelevant.
In fact, one appellate court was instrumental in adopting the
tortious conduct test for the very purpose of prohibiting discovery
into the financial condition of the settling defendant. In Dompeling
v. Superior Court, 46 the nonsettling defendant took the deposition of
the settlor and inquired exhaustively into his personal and business
assets. The settlor refused to answer on the grounds that the finan-
cial information was not relevant to the issue of the good faith of the
settlement or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admis-
sible evidence. The appellate court agreed with this argument, 41
reasoning that permitting inquiry by a nonsettlor into a settling de-
fendant's financial condition would discourage those seeking to settle
143. Tech-Bilt v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., Inc., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213
Cal. Rptr. 256.
144. Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981),
involved the discovery of a settling defendant's financial information in the context of a good
faith settlement determination, but there the court denied the discovery because it held that the
defendant's financial condition was irrelevant to the issue of good faith under the tortious
conduct test of a good faith setlement. See infra text accompanying notes 145-151.
145. For a complete discussion of the tortious conduct test, see supra text accompanying
notes 42-51.
146. 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981). In this case, a nonsettling defend-
ant cross-complained against a settling defendant for partial indemnity and the settlor defended
on the grounds that his settlement had been made in good faith. The trial court ruled that the
issue of whether the settlement was entered into in good faith would be decided in a separate
trial preceeding the trial of the underlying personal injury action. The trial court refused to
decide the matter at a pretrial hearing. Id. at 802, 173 Cal. Rptr at 40. Presumably, CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1986) had not taken effect at the time of the trial
court's ruling because pursuant to that section, the settlor was entitled to a hearing on the issue
of good faith upon the filing of a pretrial motion, rather than at a separate trial.
147. Dompeling, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 810, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 45. The trial court com-
pelled the discovery, but the court of appeal issued a writ directing the trial court to vacate its
order.
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personal injury actions.'4 8 In essence, the appellate court viewed its
task as being to encourage settlements and, therefore, it defined good
faith in such a way as to "substantially narrow the scope of the pre-
trial hearing upon the issue of a good faith settlement"' 49 so that
financial status would not be an issue except in the most extreme
case. Accordingly, the court adopted the tortious conduct test of good
faith'50 specifically to limit discovery into the settlor's financial
status.' 5'
2. Discoverability of Financial Condition Under The "Pure"
Reasonable Range Test
Like the tortious conduct test, a "pure" reasonable range test of
good faith would not create any discovery problems regarding the net
worth of the settling joint tortfeasor. Under this "pure" test, the fi-
nancial condition of the settling party would not be a factor in deter-
mining good faith,' 2 so any financial information would be non-
discoverable.
3. Discoverability of the Financial Condition of the Settling
Joint Tortfeasor Under the Tech-Bilt Test for Good Faith
a. Relevancy of Financial Information to the Issue
of Good Faith
Under certain circumstances, the financial condition of the set-
tling defendant will be relevant to the issue of the good faith of a
proposed settlement under the Tech-Bilt test. This will occur when
the settling joint tortfeasor seeks an order under Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 877.6"58 that his proposed settlement is in good faith
and claims that the settlement amount is sufficient because of his
financial condition. Such a settlement will be referred to as a "below
148. Id. at 809, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
149. Id. at 810, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
150. Id. at 809-810, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45.
151. Id. at 810, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 45. The court specifically left open the question of
discoverability of financial information:
in a different factual situation and on a different theory of materiality, for ex-
ample, where a settlement is grossly disporportionate on its face and the infor-
mation is sought as a step in establishing a corrupt agreement between the set-
tling defendant and the plaintiff.
Id.
152. For a discussion of the "pure" reasonable range test, see supra text accompanying
notes 59-64.
153. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1985).
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reasonable range settlement" because the amount would not be con-
sidered to be within the reasonable range of the settlor's fair share of
liability for plaintiff's injuries were it not for the settlor's poor finan-
cial condition.
The court of appeal in Dompeling v. Superior Court"5 4 sug-
gested that a settling defendant's financial condition would be rele-
vant to the subject matter of the good faith of a below reasonable
range settlement and, therefore, discoverable under the test of good
faith adopted by the California Supreme Court in Tech-Bilt."5 As
discussed above,"56 the Dompeling court bent over backwards to es-
tablish the tortious conduct test of good faith under which the finan-
cial condition of the settling defendant would not be relevant to the
subject matter of the action and, therefore, would not be discovera-
ble. Accordingly, the Dompeling decision illustrates that under the
test of good faith established in Tech-Bilt, in which the settler's fi-
nancial condition is indisputably a factor, the financial condition of
the settling defendant is relevant to the subject matter of the action.
Therefore, under the Tech-Bilt test, discovery into the financial con-
dition of the settling joint tortfeaser is appropriate, unless protected
by a privilege.
b. The Right of Privacy in the Good Faith Settlement
Context
The right of a settling defendant to the privacy of his financial
information should not be afforded any less protection than has been
granted in other contexts. Indeed, the court in Dompeling v. Supe-
rior Court used the defendant's right of privacy as a rationale for
defining a good faith settlement in such a way so that discovery
would not be permitted. 157
However, it could be argued that the concern for the protection
154. 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981).
155. See supra text acompanying notes 146-151.
156. If a good faith settlement issue is to be determined in a federal court, the federal
judge would apply the same rules as those laid down by the California Supreme Court in
Tech-Bilt that the financial condition of the settling joint tortfeasors is relevant to the determi-
nation of good faith. As stated by Judge Friendly in Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
378 F.2d 832, 841 (2nd Cir. 1967), the federal court does not make state law, but merely
applies it.
[Tihe Erie doctrine wisely prevents our engaging in such extensive law-making
on local tort liability, a subject which the people of [the state] have entrusted to
their legislature and, within appropriate limits, to their own courts, not to us.
Id.
157. Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 808-09, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
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of the joint tortfeasor's financial privacy should not be so strong in
the good faith settlement context as it is for one who has not put his
own financial condition in issue, such as a defendant against whom a
plaintiff has asserted a claim for punitive damages. After all, it is the
settling defendant himself who makes his financial condition a factor
in the good faith determination by seeking approval of a below rea-
sonable range settlement. Therefore, perhaps he should not be heard
to complain about allowing discovery by the nonsettling joint
tortfeasors into his net worth.
However, the bringing of a petition to confirm a good faith set-
tlement on the basis of financial condition would constitute only a
partial, and not a total, waiver of the settling defendant's right of
privacy. In an analogous situation, the plaintiff in Moskowitz v. Su-
perior Court" put in issue the question of whether he had sufficient
financial resources to stay execution of a judgment. The defendant
argued that plaintiff waived his right of privacy by filing the action.
The court of appeal held that the commencement of the action did
not constitute a total waiver of plaintiffs right of privacy for all pur-
poses. 59 While the filing of a lawsuit may implicitly bring about the
partial waiver of one's constitutional right of privacy, the scope of
such a "waiver" must be narrowly rather than expansively con-
strued, so that plaintiffs will not be unduly deterred from instituting
lawsuits by the fear of exposure of their financial condition."O Simi-
158. 137 Cal. App. 3d 313, 187 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1982).
159. Id. at 316, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 6-7.
160. Id. at 316-17, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 7. The Moskowitz court was quoting language
from Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 859, 574 P.2d at 775, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 704, which
spoke in terms of associational privacy rather than privacy of financial affairs.
The Supreme Court in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984), reaf-
firmed the Washington Supreme Court's statement emphasizing the importance of insuring
that potential litigants have unimpeded access to the courts:
[Als the trial court rightly observed, rather than expose themselves to unwanted
publicity, individuals may well forego the pursuit of their just claims. The judi-
cial system will thus have made the utilization of its remedies so onerous that
the people will be reluctant or unwilling to use it resulting in frustration of a
right as valuable as that of speech itself.
104 S. Ct at 2209 n.22.
Some courts have accepted this waiver argument in other contexts. For example, in Inde-
pendent Prod. Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) the court stated:
"[iut would be uneven justice to permit plaintiffs to invoke the powers of this court for the
purpose of seeking redress, and at the same time, to permit plaintiffs to fend off questions, the
answers to which may constitute a valid defense or materially aid the defense." Id. However, a
close look at that case shows that the court actually conducted a balancing test as is present in
Moskowitz and balanced plaintiff's first amendment rights (which were an issue in that case)
against the defendant's need for disclosure. Steinman, Privacy of Association: A Burgeoning
Privilege in Civil Discovery, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 355, 384 (1982).
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lar reasoning can be applied with respect to good faith settlements. A
tortfeasor should not be unduly discouraged from settling with the
plaintiff and using the established statutory procedure to obtain a
court determination that his settlement is in good faith. 1
c. The Needs of the Parties to be Balanced
As in other situations regarding discovery of financial condition,
in the good faith settlement context there is a conflict between the
goals of discovery and the privacy rights of the party from whom
discovery is sought. As has been shown, the courts deal with this
type of conflict by balancing the interests of the various parties and
issuing appropriate protective orders. 6 This section describes the
needs of the various parties in obtaining and preventing disclosure of
a settling defendant's financial information in the good faith settle-
ment context.
i. The Need of the Nonsettling Joint Tortfeasors to Con-
duct Discovery into a Settlor's Financial Condition: Preparation
for the Hearing and the Ascertainment of Truth
When one tortfeasor attempts to settle in good faith with the
plaintiff, he puts himself in an adversarial position with the other
defendants. 6 ' This is because the lower the amount of a good faith
settlement by one joint tortfeasor, the greater the detriment to the
nonsettling tortfeasors because they must bear the remainder of the
damages if the plaintiff ultimately recovers. 64 Therefore, when a
settling joint tortfeasor attempts to have a below reasonable range
settlement declared to be in good faith because of his financial condi-
tion, it follows that the adverse parties, that is, the nonsettling joint
tortfeasors, will need to verify his alleged financial status to be sure
that the proposed settlor is not neglecting to disclose some assets. In
order to be able to do this and to prepare rebuttal evidence if appro-
priate, the nonsettling joint tortfeasors must be able to conduct dis-
covery into the settling defendant's financial condition.
Of course, one possible solution to the discovery problem would
161. For further discussion of the danger of discouraging settlements, see infra text ac-
companying notes 178-185.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 106-130.
163. Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 809-10, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44-
45. It is interesting that the Dompeling court made this statement as paIs of its opinion to limit
the test for a good faith settlement to the tortious conduct test so that the financial condition of
the settling defendant would not be discoverable.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 178-184.
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be simply to allow no discovery at all. The settling joint tortfeasor
could serve a financial declaration under penalty of perjury on the
nonsettling parties and could then present this evidence of his finan-
cial condition at the hearing. The nonsettling joint tortfeasors could
then independently attempt to prove that the settling defendant had
greater assets. However, this solution does not seem viable. First, it
is not in accordance with the discovery rules, discussed above,165
which provide that discovery is permissible if the information sought
is relevant to the subject matter of the action or is reasonably calcu-
lated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.166 Secondly, it is
not in accordance with other cases which have established that when
net worth is an issue, discovery is allowed. 167 Thirdly, such a rule
would be unfair to the nonsettling joint tortfeasors because it would
require them, and the court as well, to take the settling defendant's
word for the extent of his financial assets. Such an approach would
certainly be aberrational in that there appears to be no other issue
for which one party is not permitted pretrial discovery to test the
sufficiency of the adverse party's contentions. 68
ii. The Needs of the Settling Joint Tortfeasor to Limit
Disclosure of his Financial Condition
(a) The Burden of Responding
The forced disclosure of financial information can have adverse
effects on a party. First, the task of responding to discovery seeking
financial information involves a severe burden. The court in Rich-
ards v. Superior Court defined this burden as the time and expense
necessary for the compilation of a complex mass of information. 69
The court in Richards explained that discovery seeking financial in-
165. See supra text accompanying notes 75-90.
166. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2016 (West 1984).
167. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 553 (1975); GT, Inc. v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d 748, 198 Cal. Rptr. 892
(1984); Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 313, 187 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1982); Martin
v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 3d 391, 167 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1980); Cobb v. Superior Court,
99 Cal. App. 3d 543, 160 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1979); Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d
265, 150 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1978); People v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 710, 127Cal. Rptr.
14 (1973); De Mayo v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 2d 392, 11 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1961).
168. See, e.g., De Mayo v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 2d 392, II Cal. Rptr. 157
(1961) (the court did not force plaintiff to take defendant's word as to the amount of his income,
but rather permitted the plaintiff to ask questions in discovery directed to uncover whether
defendant had other sources of income not previously disclosed). See supra text accompanying
notes 87-88.
169. Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d at 271, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
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formation by reason of a claim for punitive damages puts an addi-
tional burden on the responding party because the information is un-
related to the substantive claim involved in the lawsuit and is
relevant only to an amount of damages which may never be
awarded.17 0
Similarly, in the good faith settlement context, the financial in-
formation is not probative of an issue in the underlying action.
Therefore, just as in Richards, an additional burden is placed on the
settling tortfeasor by having to respond to this discovery.
(b) Adverse Consequences Apart from the Litigation
Another adverse consequence of allowing discovery of financial
information involves the potential for abuse from disclosure of the
information outside the parameters of the lawsuit. The court in
Richards put it this way: "The possibilities run all the way from
greater exposure to the not so gentle solicitations of some charitable
organizations to the possibility of damage to the discloser in the com-
petitive business arena.'
' 7
This consideration would also apply to the joint tortfeasor at-
tempting to settle in good faith. He would not welcome any adverse
consequences from that information being made public outside the
parameters of the lawsuit.
(c) The Opportunity for the Opposing Parties to Ob-
tain a Tactical Advantage in the Litigation or a Coercive
Settlement
A third consequence of forced disclosure of financial informa-
tion concerns the potential effect upon settlement. This possible ef-
fect actually results from the first two consequences set forth above.
While broad discovery rules were adopted in an effort to remove the
game element from the litigation process and thereby encourage set-
tlement based upon mutual knowledge of true facts,' 7 civil discovery
has in far too many instances become its own means of substituting a
170. Id. The court, while identifying this burden, stated that because of the broad test
for discoverable matter, the burden incident to the compilation of information that may never
be of value to anyone, seems built into the process. Id. at 272, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
171. Id. at 271, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 80; GT, Inc. v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d at
754, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 895; Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 317-18, 187 Cal.
Rptr. at 7-8.
172. Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d at 376, 364 P.2d at 275, 15 Cal.
Rptr. at 99; Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d at 270, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
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battle of attrition for a search for truth.1 73 It has become a method
by which the volume or nature of information sought and not the
probability of success of the claim or defense pressures settlement.1 " 4
This concern that discovery could be used to exert pressure to
exact an unfair settlement has been expressed by the courts in the
traditional cases in which a plaintiff was attempting to obtain finan-
cial information from the defendant. The party who can compel dis-
covery from the other can obtain a tactical advantage in settlement
negotiations because of the other party's reluctance to disclose his
financial information. 7 The threat of having to place a dollar value
on one's assets and to disclose that value to strangers may well serve
as a powerful weapon to coerce a settlement which is not warranted
by the facts of the case.17 6 Discussing the discovery of financial infor-
mation related to punitive damages, the court in Richards v. Supe-
rior Court commented that discovery seeking financial information
"is one classic instance of the manner in which civil discovery is used
to achieve a litigation advantage never contemplated when [discov-
ery] was introduced into pretrial procedure.
177
This concern is equally applicable to the disclosure of financial
information for purposes of a good faith settlement hearing. The set-
tling tortfeasor may feel compelled to make concessions to, or to even
settle with, the nonsettling joint tortfeasors in order to protect his
financial information.
In addition, he could be subject to increased pressure from the
plaintiff. When a defendant makes a motion to have his settlement
approved by the court, there is no guarantee that the court will find
the proposed settlement to be in good faith. The possibility always
exists that the court might find that the proposed settlement amount
is too low even in light of the defendant's financial condition and not
approve the settlement as being in good faith. In such a case, the
173. Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d at 270,150 Cal. Rptr. at 80. As noted
by the U.S. Supreme Court, it is clear from experience that pretrial discovery by deposition
and interrogatories has a significant potential for abuse. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S.
Ct. at 2208.
174. Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d at 270-71, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 80;
Becker, Modern Discovery: Promoting Efficient Use and Preventing Abuse of Discovery in the
Roscoe Pound Tradition, 78 F.R.D. 267, 277 (1978); Lasker, The Court Crunch: A View
From the Bench, 76 F.R.D. 245, 252-53 (1977); A.B.A. Section of Litigation Report of Special
Comm. for the Study of Discovery Abuse (Oct. 1977, 2d Printing and Revision, Dec. 1977);
Blair, Attacking the Caseload Dilemma: An Open Letter To the Bench and Bar of Iowa, 27
DRAKE L. R. 185 319, 320-21 (1977-1978).
175. Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d at 271, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
176. Id. at 272, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
177. Id. at 271, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
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defendant would need to remain in the litigation or renegotiate the
settlement amount with the plaintiff to pay an amount that would be
found to be within the reasonable range. In either event, the defend-
ant who had attempted to settle would be at a disadvantage because
now the plaintiff as well as the nonsettling joint tortfeasors would
have detailed information about his financial condition. Thus, the
defendant would be more vulnerable in settlement negotiations than
he was previously.
On the other hand, a forceful argument can be made that in the
good faith settlement context, the court need not be too concerned
with the possibility of the coercive use of the information. The set-
tling defendant must weigh the risks in deciding on the settlement
amount he attempts to have the court order is in good faith. If he
settles for an amount which is the most that he is reasonably able to
pay in light of his financial condition, the chances are very good that
the settlement will be found to be in good faith. Even if the court
denies the motion for some unforeseen reason, he will not be suscep-
tible to coercion of more money because the financial discovery will
show there is not much more money available. Thus, a settling de-
fendant who is living up to the guidelines of Tech-Bilt, i.e., is paying
as much towards his fair share of plaintiff's damages as is warranted
by his financial condition, will not be vulnerable to pressure for a
greater amount in settlement by disclosure of his financial condition.
However, if the settling defendant is attempting to pay less than
the reasonable range of his fair share even taking into account his
financial condition, then he may be susceptible to increased demands
from the plaintiff if his settlement is disapproved. Accordingly, it can
be argued that a defendant who suffers adverse consequences because
he unsuccessfully attempts to settle for too low an amount has no one
to blame but himself.
(d) The Discouragement of Settlements
The effect of discovery of financial information on the settle-
ment of a case takes on an additional and unique twist in the good
faith settlement context. One of the recognized goals behind the rule
allowing a tortfeasor to be totally free from the litigation if he enters
into a good faith settlement is to encourage settlements.'18 Therefore,
178. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 38 Cal. 3d at 494, 698 P.2d at 162,
213 Cal. Rptr. at 260; Fisher v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d at 443,163 Cal. Rptr. at 53;
River Garden Farms v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 993, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 503; Rob-
erts, supra note 17, at 883-91.
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another concern, peculiar to the good faith settlement context, is that
settlements might be discouraged if a settling defendant is forced to
disclose his financial information.
The possibility of discouraging settlements arises because a set-
tling defendant's financial condition would not be discoverable by the
plaintiff or the other defendants as far as the underlying cause of
action is concerned."19 Therefore, if financial information is discover-
able for a good faith settlement hearing, a defendant who attempts to
settle with the plaintiff has opened himself up to an invasion of pri-
vacy that would not otherwise be allowed if he did not settle. Such a
concern was the motivating factor behind the decision in Dompeling
v. Superior Court80 in which the court adopted the tortious conduct
test of good faith for the precise purpose of making financial infor-
mation nondiscoverable. The court feared that otherwise settlements
would be discouraged. "[I]f nonsettling defendants may depose de-
fendants who have settled regarding their personal assets and fi-
nances in every case, an obvious result will be to discourage those
seeking to settle personal injury actions."1 "
Another way that compelling disclosure of a settling defendant's
financial condition might discourage settlement is the same concern
expressed by the court in Richards and described above'8 2-once the
other parties know the financial condition of a settling defendant,
they could use it for coercive purposes. This possibility might dis-
courage a defendant from attempting to enter into a good faith settle-
ment in the first place.
Therefore, even under the good faith settlement rules after
Tech-Bilt, care must be taken that settlements are not unduly dis-
couraged. It is true that the California Supreme Court's decision in
Tech-Bilt overturned once and for all the previously prevailing view
that the policy of encouragement of settlements is paramount and
that, therefore, all settlements regardless of how small should be
found to be in good faith." 8 The supreme court gave equal standing
to the policy of equitable apportionment of loss by adopting the rea-
sonable range test of good faith which finds to be in good faith, and
thereby encourages, those settlements that fall within the reasonable
range of the settling defendant's fair share of liability for plaintiff's
179. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
180. Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 809; 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
181. Id. at 809, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 172-77.
183. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166,
213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
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injuries.18"
However, the California Supreme Court in Tech-Bilt also pro-
nounced that settlements may be found to be in good faith if the
financial condition and the insurance policy limits of the settling de-
fendant so warrant.1 85 In other words, when the settling defendant is
unable to pay more, a below reasonable range settlement is to be
encouraged by finding that it, too, is in good faith. Therefore, a legit-
imate concern in considering the scope of discovery of the settling
defendant's financial information is that defendants should not be
unduly deterred from attempting to enter into a settlement with the
plaintiff by the fear of exposure of their financial condition.
C. Suggested Guidelines for Limiting Discovery in the Good Faith
Settlement Context
The preceding sections have shown that when the settling de-
fendant attempts to have the court find that because of his financial
status a settlement that is not otherwise within the reasonable range
of his fair share of liability is in good faith, information regarding
his net worth is relevant to the good faith determination, is likely to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and is, therefore, discov-
erable. 186 Therefore, in this situation, a trial court should not pre-
vent discovery into a settling defendant's financial condition. The dis-
closure of the financial information is necessary so that the
nonsettling tortfeasors can properly prepare their case to rebut the
settling defendant's claim of a good faith settlement, thereby further-
ing the public policy of ascertaining the truth.
However, the settling defendant's right of privacy must also be
considered.' 87 The possible adverse consequences of forcing complete
disclosure of this information have been shown,'88 and the right of
privacy dictates that the compelled disclosure be narrowly drawn to
assure maximum protection of the constitutional interests at stake.8 9
As in other cases in which discovery of relevant information
conflicts with a party's right of privacy, in the good faith settlement
context, the court should respond by exercising its discretion in tai-
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 153-56.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 157-61.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 169-85.
189. See Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 859, 574 P.2d at 775, 143 Cal. Rptr. at
704; In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d at 435, 467 P.2d at 570, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 842; Moskowitz v.
Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 317, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
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loring an appropriate protective order."' In so doing, the court
should balance the interests of discovery with the privacy interest of
the settling defendant.
Therefore, discovery should be allowed but the financial infor-
mation should be disclosed only to the extent necessary to further the
truth ascertainment purpose of discovery.191 Only when the discovery
is so limited is the invasion of the settlor's privacy within constitu-
tionally permissible limits. 9"
The following are suggested guidelines that a trial court can use
to fashion protective orders and other discovery orders concerning
discovery of a settling defendant's financial information in prepara-
tion for a good faith settlement hearing.
1. No Discovery Until Financial Condition is in Issue
The first point is obvious. Unless otherwise warranted by the
facts of the underlying litigation, no discovery into any defendant's
financial condition should be allowed until that defendant has filed a
petition under Code of Civil Procedure section 887.6"" to have a
proposed or completed settlement with the plaintiff be determined to
be in good faith.
The court should require the settling defendant to set forth in
his petition for a good faith determination whether he contends that
the settlement is within the reasonable range of his fair share of lia-
bility for plaintiff's injuries without taking into account his financial
condition, or whether he contends his (lower) settlement amount is
appropriate because of his personal financial condition. In the former
case, no pretrial discovery into the settling defendant's financial con-
dition should be allowed whatsoever because his net worth is irrele-
vant to the subject matter of the good faith determination and is,
therefore, not discoverable. It is only when a settling defendant as-
serts as a sole or alternative ground in his petition that his settlement
amount should be found to be in good faith given his financial condi-
tion that his net worth becomes relevant and, therefore, discoverable.
In this way, the settling defendant is completely protected from dis-
covery of his financial condition until he himself puts it in issue.
Of course, if a defendant fails to allege in his petition for ap-
190. Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 656 Cal. 2d at 380, 364 P.2d at 277-78, 15
Cal. Rptr. at 101-02; Cobb v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d at 551, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 567.
See supra text accompanying notes 106-14.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 106-11.
193. CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1985).
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proval of his settlement that the settlement amount is appropriate
because of his financial condition and, therefore, no discovery into
his finances is conducted by the nonsettling joint tortfeasors, then he
should not be permitted to argue his financial condition at the good
faith hearing. In that event, the court would have the discretion ei-
ther to deny the motion to approve the settlement as being in good
faith or to grant a continuance to permit the nonsettling joint
tortfeasors to conduct discovery into the financial condition of the
settling defendant. 94
The following guidelines presume that a settling defendant has
filed a petition to have a settlement approved as being in good faith
and has asserted in his papers that the settlement amount is reasona-
ble because of his financial condition, among other factors.
2. Timing of Discovery
As soon as a motion described in the preceding paragraph is
filed, the nonsettling joint tortfeasors should be able to commence
discovery into the financial condition of the settling defendant. In all
likelihood, this will necessitate a setting of the actual hearing on the
good faith settlement for a time far in excess of the twenty day notice
requirement provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6.95
In Cobb v. Superior Court, in which the financial disclosure
was occasioned by a claim for punitive damages, the court suggested
that it would seldom be necessary for a court to permit discovery of
financial affairs before discovery on the merits of the underlying ac-
tion.1' 6 This does not make sense when the financial information
sought goes to the issue of a good faith settlement. Because a good
faith settlement hearing is a pretrial procedure and because, presum-
ably, one of the reasons the settling defendant wishes to settle is to
extricate himself from the litigation at as early a point as possible, 9 '
by necessity, the discovery of financial information in the good faith
context must occur prior to or concurrently with the discovery on the
underlying action. Even so, as a practical matter, the parties will not
be able to apprise the court of the information relevant to the other
factors of a good faith settlement such as the probable percentage of
the negligence of the various joint tortfeasors and the probable
194. A continuance of a hearing may readily be had for discovery purposes. See Corbett
v. Free Press Ass'n, 50 F.R.D. 179, 182 (D. Vt. 1970).
195. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877.6(a) (West Supp. 1985).
196. 99 Cal. App. 3d at 550, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
197. Roberts, supra note 17, at 929.
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amount of plaintiffs damages"" until a great deal of discovery has
been conducted on the underlying action. Nevertheless, the trial
court should allow discovery of financial affairs for purposes of the
good faith settlement hearing to be undertaken without restriction as
to its timing in relation to other discovery.
3. Use of the Information for Other Purposes
Another issue a trial court will need to face in a discovery dis-
pute is whether to restrict the use of the information disclosed. As
mentioned above, cases dealing with discovery of financial condition
in other contexts have held that it is appropriate to grant a protective
order to limit the use of the information gained in the discovery pro-
cess. 199 One common provision of such a protective order is that the
information can be used only for purposes of the instant lawsuit.
200
Such reasoning appears equally compelling with respect to discovery
in the good faith settlement context. Furthermore, in this context
probably an even more restrictive protective order should be pro-
vided. Not only should the information obtained be limited to the
instant lawsuit, but it should be limited to use for purposes of the
good faith settlement hearing only and not utilized for any other
purpose in the underlying lawsuit.
4. Access to the Information
a. Limiting Access to Attorneys and Experts Only
and Not to Parties
The next issue to be considered along these same lines is who
should have access to the financial information obtained. The courts
in Richards, Cobb, Martin and Moskowitz held that the party from
whom the financial disclosure was obtained was presumptively enti-
tled to a protective order limiting disclosure to the adverse party's
attorneys and experts and prohibiting disclosure to the party him-
self.2 0 1 As will be shown below, in the case of a good faith settle-
198. See supra text accompanying notes 54-62.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 120-28.
200. Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 319,187 Cal. Rptr. at 6; Cobb v.
Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d at 566-67, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 551; Richards v. Superior Court,
86 Cal. App. 3d at 272, 150 Cal Rptr. at 81. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
This is also a common type of protective order in federal practice. ICC v. Mercantile
Nat'l Bd. of Chicago, 84 F.R.D. 345 (D.C. Ill. 1979).
201. Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 317-18, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 7-8;
Martin v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 395, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 813; Cobb v. Superior
Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d at 549, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 565; Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal.
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ment, it also seems appropriate that the balancing of the need for
discovery with the settling defendant's right of privacy compels a
protective order limiting disclosure of the information to the attor-
neys and experts for the nonsettling joint tortfeasors. °20
b. Burden of Proof on Order Limiting Access
A preliminary issue that will arise concerns the burden of proof
on such a protective order. While the previously mentioned cases
held that the party was presumptively entitled to this type of order,
the court in GT, Inc. v. Superior Court contradicted Moskowitz and
held that where the information sought is relevant to the issues in-
volved at the heart of the underlying litigation, a protective order
limiting access could be given, but the burden would be on the party
from whom the disclosure was sought to establish good cause for
such a protective order.20
Whether such a protective order should be presumed so that the
discovering party has the burden of showing it should not be
granted, or whether it should be granted only on a showing of good
cause so that the disclosing party has the burden of showing the pro-
tective order necessary, is open to debate. The financial information
of a settling defendant for the purposes of a good faith settlement
hearing does not fit squarely within the mold of either Richards, in
which the financial information went only to a claim for punitive
damages, or GT, in which the financial information went "to the
heart of the cause of action itself.' '20 4 In the vast majority of cases
where good faith settlements are sought, the underlying causes of
action will be for personal injury or property damage in which case
the financial information of the defendant would not be discoverable
as far as the lawsuit itself is concerned. It is only when a defendant
wishes to enter into a below reasonable range settlement and at-
tempts to support that low settlement figure with his financial condi-
tion, that the financial condition of the settling defendant becomes
relevant. Therefore, in one respect, the good faith determination
seems to involve a collateral issue.
On the other hand, if the settlement is found to be in good faith,
that finding will terminate the settling defendant's participation in
App. 3d at 272, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 81. See supra text accompanying notes 115-28.
202. See infra text accompanying note 209.
203. 151 Cal. App. 3d at 754, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 896. For a complete discussion of burden
of proof in other cases, see supra text accompanying notes 131-42.
204. Id. at 754, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
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the litigation. Thus, the financial condition of the settling defendant
is an issue that goes "to the heart of" the issue of good faith at the
good faith settlement hearing. Because a finding of good faith will
terminate the settling defendant's participation in the entire litigation
including his liability to any other joint tortfeasors, it does not seem
that the issue of good faith is the same sort of peripheral issue as is a
claim for punitive damages.
It seems, therefore, that the issue of a good faith settlement is
somewhere in between the punitive damages situation in which the
financial information is related to a peripheral issue and the type of
case exemplified by GT in which the financial information goes to
the heart of the lawsuit. This distinction may not be crucial because
the court in Moskowitz issued a protective order even when the fi-
nancial information was relevant to an issue in the underlying law-
suit.2"5 That case seems to be a better reasoned opinion than GT
because limitations on discovery of a constitutional nature such as
the right of privacy should take precedence over a showing of good
cause for a protective order mandated by California Code of Civil
Procedure section 2019.20
In any event, technical interpretations of the burden of proof
should not be determinative. The important point for a court to con-
sider in deciding the overriding issue of who should have access to
the financial information is whether the adverse parties themselves
need access to the information. Richards and its progeny declared
that seldom would the party, as opposed to his attorneys and experts,
need the information to prepare the case. 07 The GT court felt that
when the financial condition of a party was interwoven into the mer-
its of the lawsuit, the adverse party would need to know the infor-
mation to help prepare his case.20 8 In the good faith settlement con-
text, there seems to be no reason why the adverse parties, i.e., the
nonsettling joint tortfeasors, need access to the settling defendant's
financial information. They can help prepare the case as to the mer-
its of the underlying action without the need for the settlor's finan-
cial information, which is irrelevant to that action. Their attorneys
can present any arguments that are necessary on whether the settle-
ment amount is appropriate in terms of the settlor's financial condi-
tion and it does not appear that any detriment will flow to the non-
settlors by not having access to this information.
205. Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 317, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 8.
206. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2019 (West 1983); Civ. LIT. R., 80-81 (CEB 1984).
207. Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d at 272, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
208. GT, Inc. v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 754, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 895-96.
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Accordingly, in most cases it would seem appropriate for the
trial court presumptively to limit the disclosure of the settling de-
fendant's financial information to the attorneys and experts (if neces-
sary) for the adverse parties and not to allow access to the parties
themselves.
c. Limiting Access To the Attorneys and Experts for the
Nonsettling Joint Tortfeasors
A related issue is which attorneys and experts should have ac-
cess to the financial information. With respect to a good faith settle-
ment, the only attorneys and experts, who need access to the settling
defendant's financial information in order to test his allegations as to
his financial condition are those for the nonsettling joint tortfeasors.
This is because only the nonsettling joint tortfeasor will oppose the
finding of good faith. The plaintiff and the settling defendant are on
the same side in the good faith hearing because both wish the settle-
ment to be approved as being in good faith. There would be no good
faith settlement if the plaintiff had not been willing to accept the
settlement amount in the first place. Therefore, it is unnecessary for
either the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorneys to have access to the
settling defendant's financial information. Furthermore, as demon-
strated earlier, if the settlement is not approved by the court as being
in good faith, the defendant may then be at a significant strategic
disadvantage if either the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorneys know his
financial situation. 09 Thus, the settling joint tortfeasor should be
able to obtain a protective order limiting the disclosure of his finan-
cial information solely to the attorneys and experts for the nonset-
tling joint tortfeasors.
5. Mechanisms for Limiting Access
In order to limit access of the information to only those attor-
neys and experts to whom access was granted, the court would need
to make one or more of the following specific types of protective
orders.
a. Order of Nondisclosure
The court should order those persons who are entitled to know
the financial condition of the settling defendant (presumably only the
attorneys and experts for the nonsettling joint tortfeasors) not to dis-
209. See supra text accompanying and following notes 172-77.
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close the financial information to anyone else, including their cli-
ents. 10 Such an order can take any number of forms, including sim-
ply "that counsel [and experts] are herewith ordered and directed to
maintain the confidentiality of any such information,"211 to an order
that counsel and experts are "enjoined" from disclosing the informa-
tion to anyone else,2"' to a more elaborate order seeking to reduce
the risk of loss of confidentiality by limiting the number of copies
made of the information by those who are entitled to access."'
Additionally, the court should also order that the information
obtained be used for purposes of the instant lawsuit only, as set forth
previously.2 '
b. Sealing the Discovery Documents
In addition, the court could order that all discovery documents
containing the settling defendant's financial information be sealed.
"Sealing" means that the discovery documents are filed with the
court in a sealed envelope to be opened only by further order of the
court. The court may seal any type of discovery document including
deposition transcripts215 and interrogatory answers.2"
210. For a discussion of first amendment considerations in such an order, see supra note
128.
211. Metal Foil Manufacturing Co. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 292,
294 (E.D. Va. 1970).
212. 2 J.N. DEMEO & J.F. DEMEo, CALIFORNIA DEPOSITION AND DISCOVERY
PRACTICE T 5.11(46) (1985).
213. In Liberty Folder v. Curtis Anthony Corp., 90 F.R.D. 80 (S.D. Ohio 1981), the
court limited the number of copies of the discovered information that could be circulated
among counsel.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 199-200.
215. Both CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §2019(b)(1) (West 1983) and FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c)(6)
provide that the court may order "that after being sealed the deposition shall be opened only
by order of the court."
In Moskowitz v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 315, 318, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 8, the
petitioner requested a protective order, which, among other things, provided for the sealing of
the deposition, and the appellate court stated that the burden was on the other side to establish
a reason for the denial of the order sought by petitioner. See also 2 J.N. DEMEO & J.F.
DEMEO, supra note 212, at 5.11(10) (discussing the state court's power to seal discovery).
For orders sealing discovery in federal practice, see International Products Corp. v.
Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 1963) in which a deposition was sealed; American Sec. Co.
v. Shatterproof Gears Corp., 20 F.R.D. 196 (D. Del. 1957), recognizing the power of the court
to seal a deposition until further order. Similarly in Marshwood Co. v. Jamie Mills, Inc., 10
F.R.D. 386 (D.C. Ohio 1950), aff'd on rehearing, 10 F.R.D. 590 (D.C. Ohio 1950), the court
ordered the deposition sealed and not opened without court order because of possible disclosure
of financial information. The Marshwood case is cited as authority for such a protective order
in California state courts in CALIFORNIA CIVIL DISCOVERY PRACTICE 63 (CEB 1975). See
also International Prod. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Inter-
national Business Machines Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.
1986] JOINT TORTFEASOR CONFIDENTIALITY
An order sealing discovery seems especially appropriate in the
good faith settlement context. Such an order is often issued for the
purpose of preventing harm to a party which might result from pub-
licizing the contents of a document when that document contains
confidential personal information.21 7 Sealing the discovery documents
is one of the options the appellate court in Cobb specifically directed
a trial court to consider in determining an appropriate protective or-
der for financial information. 18 Sealing was also suggested by the
California Supreme Court in the context of protecting the financial
information of third parties."' Accordingly, it seems that an order
sealing discovery documents such as deposition transcripts and an-
swers to interrogatories that contain information about the settling
defendant's financial condition should be considered when discovery
of a settling joint tortfeasor's financial condition is undertaken. Of
course, any such sealing must take place after, or allow for, the ex-
amination of the documents by the attorneys and experts for the non-
settling joint tortfeasors.
If the court does not wish to undertake the supervision of the
documents necessitated by sealing, the court could simply order that
the documents be kept confidential and not be open to inspection.22 °
c. Separate Discovery of Financial Information and Ex-
clusion of Persons From the Discovery Proceedings
The discovery of the settling defendant's financial information
relevant to the good faith hearing should be conducted separately
from discovery into the merits of plaintiff's claims and defendant's
v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 84 F.R.D. 345 (E.D. Ill. 1979).
216. Interrogatory answers were ordered sealed to protect financial information in Mar-
tin v. Superior Court, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 393, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 812 (overturning trial court's
order for other reasons).
For examples of cases in federal practice, see Nichols v. Philadelphia Tribune Co., 22
F.R.D. 89 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (a libel action in which answers to interrogatories were ordered
sealed in an envelope, their contents to be revealed only by permission of the court, to protect
the plaintiff from publicity). See also Maritime Cinema Service Corp. v. Movies En Route,
Inc., 60 F.R.D. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 23 F.R.D. I
(S.D.N.Y. 1958). See generally Note, Protective Orders Restricting Discovery in Federal Civil
Proceedings, 56 CHICAGO KENT L. REV. 943, 956-57 (1980).
217. Annot., 19 A.L.R. FED. 970, 978-79 (1974).
218. 99 Cal. App. 3d at 551, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 566. See also Moskowitz v. Superior
Court, discussed supra note 215, and Martin v. Superior Court discussed supra note 216.
219. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d at 658, 542 P.2d at 980, 125
Cal. Rptr. at 556.
220. 2 J.N. DEMEO & J.F. DEMEO, supra note 212, at 1 9.01(51). This type of order is
discussed supra text accompanying notes 199-200 and 210-14.
1 113
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
defenses on the underlying causes of action. While all parties and
attorneys must be able to take part in and have access to discovery on
the other issues in the lawsuit, only certain persons (i.e., those who
are to have access to the information) should take part in the discov-
ery of the defendant's financial affairs.
This is easy to accomplish in the case of discovery by interroga-
tories. The court could order that the interrogatory answers dealing
with the settling defendant's financial condition be served on the
counsel for the nonsettling joint tortfeasors only and that those coun-
sel may not reveal the information to their clients or to anyone
else.221 Additionally, the court could order the answers sealed.2 22
The issue becomes more difficult with respect to oral deposi-
tions. It seems logical that if a deposition is taken, the court should
limit the attendance at the deposition to only those persons who are
to have access to the information. Both state and federal courts have
the power to exclude from a deposition everyone except the counsel
and parties. 23 The interesting issue is whether the parties them-
selves, that is, the nonsettling joint tortfeasors, may also be excluded.
In federal practice the court could order that the deposition of
the settling defendant be taken on the subject of his financial condi-
tion with no one present except his attorney and the attorneys for the
nonsettling joint tortfeasors. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(c)(5) is phrased to allow the court to order "that discovery be
conducted with no one present except persons designated by the
court. ' '224 Thus, the court may even exclude a party from a deposi-
tion. 220 This procedure has been used to protect confidential infor-
mation, 226 and therefore could logically be applied in the good faith
settlement context.227
221. See supra text accompanying notes 210-14.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 215-19.
223. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019(b)(1) (West 1983); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(5).
224. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(5).
225. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 997 (2d Cir. 1973); Beacon v. R.M. Jones Apart-
ment Rentals, 89 F.R.D. 141, 142 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp., 16 Fed. R.
Serv. 2d 110 (N.D. II1. 1972).
226. Metal Foil Prod. Mfg. Co. v. Reynolds Metal Co., 55 F.R.D. 491, 16 Fed. R. Serv.
2d 292, 294 (E.D. Va. 1970). In that case, an antitrust action, the court ordered that only
plaintiff's counsel may be present during the depositions of the defendant's officers when the
subject of the inquiry was allegedly confidential or privileged. Id. See also 4 J. MOORE, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 26.73 (2d ed. 1975).
227. An order excluding a party from a deposition has also been used in other contexts,
such as to prevent harassment or ridicule of a deponent. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d at 997.
That case involved an action by a photographer who was allegedly harassing Jacqueline Onas-
sis and her children, against Mrs. Onassis and three secret service agents for false arrest,
malicious prosecution, and interference with trade. The court of appeal held that the trial
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The answer is not so clear in California and a good argument
can be made that under California law a party may not be excluded
from a deposition. No California case has dealt with whether a party
may be excluded. 2 s California Code of Civil Procedure section
2019(b)(1) allows the court to order that a deposition be taken "with
no one present except the parties to the action and their officers or
counsel."'2 2 9 The argument that parties cannot be excluded because
of this provision stems from the interpretation of the analogous Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure. Former Rule 30(b) was identical to
California Code of Civil Procedure section 2019(b)(1) cited above.230
In 1970, the Federal Rule was changed to allow discovery with "no
one present except persons designated by the court. '21  After this
revision occurred, the federal courts held that they were entitled, be-
cause of the revision, to exclude even a party.23 2 Because the Califor-
nia provision has not followed the federal lead and still contains the
reference to "parties," it can be argued that a party may not be ex-
cluded under any circumstances.
On the other hand, the counter argument can be made that an
order excluding a party from a deposition could be made under cer-
tain circumstances. While Code of Civil Procedure section
2019(b)(1) enumerates certain types of protective orders, that list is
court clearly had the power to exclude the plaintiff photographer from Mrs. Onassis' deposi-
tion. While upholding the trial court's exclusion order, the appellate court noted that "such an
exclusion should be ordered rarely indeed." Id. In that case the order was justified because the
court could reasonably have anticipated misconduct during the deposition because the plaintiff
had already violated the court's temporary restraining order; this conduct could be deemed to
reflect an intent to further harass Mrs. Onassis or disregard for the judicial process. Id.
In addition, this type of protective order has been utilized by the federal courts to assure
that successive deponents give independent testimony. Beacon v. R.M. Jones Apartment Rent-
als, 79 F.R.D. at 142 (separation of depositions of defendants in a Title VIII housing discrimi-
nation action); Milsen Co. v. Southland Co., 16 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 110 (N.D. III. 1972) (in order
that defendant could obtain the independent recollection of each plaintiff, the court excluded
each plaintiff from the depositions of co-plaintiffs preceding that plaintiff's deposition); Queen
City Brewing Co. v. Duncan, 42 F.R.D. 32 (D. Md. 1966); Dunlap v. Reading Co., 30
F.R.D. 129, 5 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (sequestration permitted in pretrial depositions in FELA
action).
228. When discussing this rule, the commentators mention the ability to exclude persons
other than parties and do not address the issue of whether parties can be excluded under some
circumstances. See, e.g., 6 H.M. GROSSMAN & A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE §
194 (West 1972); 2 J.N. DEMEO & J.F. DEMEO, CALIFORNIA DEPOSITION AND DISCOVERY
'PRACTICE 1 5.11(9) (1985).
229. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 2019(b)(1) (West 1983).
230. See supra text accompanying note 229.
231. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c).
232. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d at 997; Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp., 16 Fed. R.
Serv. 110-11.
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by no means exclusive." 8 The section also gives the court the power
to "make any other order which justice requires to protect the party
or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression. 1"4 Be-
cause the California courts have consistently held that with respect to
discovery of financial information a party is entitled to a protective
order limiting disclosure of that information to the adverse counsel
only and not to the adverse party,23 5 it seems logical that the court
would have the power to exclude the adverse party from the deposi-
tion insofar as the topic of discovery is the defendant's financial in-
formation.23 6 The holdings prohibiting the disclosure of the informa-
tion to the adverse parties by their attorneys makes sense only if the
parties could be excluded from the deposition itself.
If a California court does not have the power to exclude a party
(i.e., the nonsettling tortfeasor) from a deposition inquiring into the
financial condition of a settling tortfeasor, the only alternative ap-
pears to be for the court to order that the discovery into financial
information be done via interrogatories rather than deposition.2 37 Of
course, written interrogatories are not an effective substitute for an
oral deposition during which counsel may employ the techniques of
cross-examination on an adverse party. 38
Because an absolute ban on the taking of a deposition should
233. The possible range of protective orders is quite broad. Section 2019(b)(1) lists a
number of examples, but then goes on to allow the court to make any other order which justice
requires. 6 H.M. GROSSMAN & A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE §188 (West 1972).
234. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 2019(b)(I) (West 1983).
235. See supra text accompanying notes 115-28.
236. In fact, Cobb and Moskowitz, in which the courts held a party was presumptiveely
entitled to a protective order limiting access to his financial information to the adverse attorney
only, involved discovery in the form of depositions. These courts did not deal with the issue of
whether the adverse parties could be excluded from the deposition because presumably the
adverse parties had not attempted to attend the depositions in question. Cobb involved both
deposition and interrogatories and Moskowitz involved a deposition only. This issue was not
faced in Richards and Martin because those cases dealt with discovery by interrogatories, not
depositions.
237. This is allowed under CAL. CIv. PRioc. CODE § 2019(b)(1) because the court may
order that the deposition shall not be taken. (The court may also order that the deposition be
taken by written interrogatories, but this is a different procedure). In Richards and Martin,
also cases preventing an attorney from disclosing the other party's financial information to his
client, interrogatories and not depositions were involved.
238. 6 H.M. GROSSMAN & A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE § 192 (West
1972). "[It has long been recognized that there are far greater advantages in obtaining the
facts and circumstances involved in a confronting examination than in a written one."
Goldberg v. Raleigh Manufacturers, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 975, 976 (D. Mass 1939) (upholding a
party's right to take a deposition even though the same information might be available by
interrogatories.)
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only be granted in extreme cases,2"9 and Richards and its progeny
dictate that the opposing party not have access to the adversary's
financial data, 240 there seems to be but one logical approach to that
dilemma in California. The court should use its power to make "any
other order which justice requires to prevent a party from annoy-
ance, embarrassment, or oppression" to exclude everyone from a
deposition pertaining to a settling defendant's financial condition ex-
cept the attorneys for the nonsettling joint tortfeasors.
By coupling an order limiting attendance at a deposition (or
limiting access to interrogatory answers) with an order sealing the
discovery documents241 and an order prohibiting disclosure to other
persons,24 2 the court can provide maximum protection for a settling
defendant's financial information. 43
6. A Protective Order Must be Requested by the Settlor
Any protective order would be given for the purpose of protect-
ing the settling defendant's right of privacy of his financial informa-
tion. Therefore, a protective order should be given only on the appli-
cation of the settling defendant. If, for some reason, that party did
not care whether his financial information was disclosed to the non-
settling joint tortfeasors themselves, to plaintiff's attorneys, to plain-
tiff, or to the world at large, then he would not seek a protective
order. If a protective order was sought, the trial court would tailor it
to meet the specific needs and requests of the settling defendant. For
example, if the settling defendant has already disclosed his financial
information to plaintiff and plaintiff's attorneys as part of settlement
negotiations, then he would not need a protective order preventing
the disclosure of this information to those parties. He may neverthe-
less desire a protective order sealing the information and preventing
its disclosure for purposes outside the litigation.
7. Summary
In short, the interests of the various parties involved in a pro-
ceeding to determine the good faith of a proposed settlement must be
239. 6 H.M. GROSSMAN & A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE § 189 (West
1972). It is the right of the discovering party to chose his method of examination. Goldberg v.
Raleigh Manufacturers, Inc., 28 F. Supp. at 977.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 115-28.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 215-19.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 210-14.
243. Cf 2 J.N. DEMEO & J.F. DEMEO, CALIFORNIA DEPOSITION AND DISCOVERY
PRACTICE 11 5.11(10); 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.74.
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balanced in order to give the nonsettling tortfeasors access to the in-
formation they need to present their case and to protect the privacy
of the settling defendant. As with other instances in which financial
information is sought to be disclosed, the court can obtain that bal-
ance by fashioning an appropriate protective order.
Of course, the settling defendant can always prevent discovery
into his financial condition by settling for an amount within the
range of his fair share of liability for plaintiff's injuries without ref-
erence to his financial status.
IV. DISCOVERY OF THE INSURANCE POLICY LIMITS OF THE
SETTLING DEFENDANT
.Another factor identified by the court in Tech-Bilt as relevant to
the determination of good faith is the insurance policy limits of the
settling defendant."" The amount of a settlor's insurance is in actu-
ality simply one element of that party's financial condition. How-
ever, unlike other information regarding the settling defendant's fi-
nancial condition in the context of a good faith settlement, discovery
of his insurance policy limits does not pose any unique problems.
The existence and amount of a defendant's liability insurance have
never been held to be protected by the right of privacy and are
discoverable. '"
The cases allowing discovery of a defendant's insurance policy
limits have involved discovery by the plaintiff. No case has ever
squarely dealt with the issue of discoverability of a defendant's lia-
bility insurance by a co-defendant as opposed to the plaintiff. Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure such discovery would be al-
lowed because Rule 26(b)(2) allows any party to discover the exis-
244. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166,
213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
245. Doak v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. App. 2d at 828, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 195; Pettie v.
Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 2d 680, 683, 3 Cal. Rptr. 267, 268-69 (1960); Laddon v. Supe-
rior Court, 167 Cal. App. 2d 391, 394-95, 334 P.2d 638, 639-40 (1959).
It being the established public policy in California that provisions of a lia-
bility insurance policy are not a matter for the sole knowledge of the [named
insured] and the insurance carrier to the exclusion of the injured person, it may
well follow that the revelation of the liability limits of such insurance policy will
tend to promote the efficacious disposition of negligence litigation by settlement
or trial.
Pettie v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 2d 680, 688-89, 3 Cal. Rptr. 267, 272 (1960).
Significantly, this rationale has specifically not been applied to permit pretrial discovery
with respect to the financial condition of the defendant even though knowledge of the extent
and nature of a defendant's other asset might also tend to promote settlement. Doak v. Supe-
rior Court, 257 Cal. App. 2d at 830, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
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tence and content of an insurance agreement.2 46
No similar rule exists in California. The California cases al-
lowing discovery have dealt only with the plaintiff's right to obtain
information. Those cases have predicated plaintiff's right to discov-
ery on the ground that the California Insurance Code247 creates a
contractual interest between an insurer and someone injured by the
insured.148 Therefore, the same reasoning would not seem to apply
to discovery by a co-defendant.
However, the California courts allowing discovery have also
used more general language saying that the existence and amount of
an insurance policy is relevant to the subject matter of the action, 49
and under this broad rationale, the policy limits should be discovera-
ble by any party involved in the action. Furthermore, co-defendants
do routinely learn of the amount of another defendant's insurance.
Answers to plaintiff's interrogatories, in which a defendant would
disclose that information, are normally served on all parties to the
litigation.250 No reported case has ever granted a protective order
limiting disclosure of insurance information to the plaintiff only, al-
246. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) provides:
A party may obtain discovery of the existence and contents of any insurance
agreement under which any person carrying on an insurance business may be
liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment which may be entered in the action or
to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. Informa-
tion concerning the insurance agreement is not by reason of disclosure admissi-
ble in evidence at trial. For purposes of this paragraph, an application for in-
surance shall not be treated as part of an insurance agreement.
Id.
247. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580 (West Supp. 1985).
248. Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 749, 754, 235 P.2d 833, 835 (1951);
Pettie v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 2d 680, 686, 3 Cal. Rptr. 267, 270 (1960).
The discoverability of insurance policy limits is based on the fact that under CAL. INS.
CODE § 11580, a contractual relationship is created between the insurer under a liability policy
and a third person who may be negligently injured by the insured. Therefore, the provisions of
such a policy are not a matter for the sole knowledge of the named insured to the exclusion of
the injured person. The very pendency of an action by the injured person brought in good faith
against the named insured gives the former a discoverable interest in the policy. Superior Ins.
Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 749, 754, 235 P.2d 833, 835-36 (1951); see also Doak v.
Superior Court, 257 Cal. App. 2d at 829, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
249. Pettie v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. at 685-87, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 270-71; Laddon
v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. App. 2d at 396, 334 P.2d at 640.
250. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 2030 (West 1983) provides in part:
Copies of all interrogatories and of all answers thereto shall be served upon all
other parties to the action who have appeared; but the court ... may waive this
requirement if the court determines that enforcement thereof would be unduly
expensive, oppressive, or burdensome.
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though the court has the power to do so."'
No reason exists why the practice of allowing a co-defendant
access to another defendant's insurance information should be any
different in the good faith settlement context. Accordingly, unlike sit-
uations involving other financial information, no barrier prevents the
other parties to the litigation from learning the extent of a settling
defendant's liability insurance if the defendant claims that his finan-
cial resources are relevant to the good faith of his settlement.
V. PROTECTION OF THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE SETTLOR'S
FINANCIAL INFORMATION AT THE GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT
HEARING ITSELF AND IN DOCUMENTS FILED WITH THE COURT
The protective orders suggested in Part III are designed to safe-
guard the privacy of the settling defendant's financial affairs. Al-
though no court has addressed this problem, it seems certain that if
protective orders limiting access to or disclosure of a defendant's fi-
nancial information are required by the right of privacy in the dis-
covery context, then this same protection must be afforded in other
phases of the good faith determination. This section of the article
suggests mechanisms that should be established to limit access to a
settling defendant's financial information: 1) contained in the moving
and responding papers filed in preparation for the good faith settle-
ment hearing; and 2) disclosed at the good faith settlement hearing
itself.
These mechanisms are necessary because many of the benefits
of a discovery protective order will be lost if the information is dis-
closed in open court at the good faith settlement hearing with all
attorneys and parties present, or in documents served and filed pur-
suant to that hearing. It makes no sense for a court to order that
under Richards, only the nonsettling joint tortfeasor's attorneys and
experts are entitled to know the financial worth of the settling de-
fendant, 252 only to have the nonsettling joint tortfeasors themselves,
plaintiffs, plaintiffs attorneys, and anyone else who is curious listen
to the disclosure of this information at the good faith settlement
hearing or read about it in court files.
The dangers of neglecting to ensure confidentiality are two-fold.
Even if the proposed settlement is found to be in good faith, the
settling defendant has still lost the confidentiality the protective order
251. Id.
252. Richards v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d at 272, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 81. See
supra text accompanying notes 115-28.
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was meant to ensure because all those present at the good faith hear-
ing would learn of his financial condition if this information is
presented orally. The same result would occur if the relevant docu-
ments were open to perusal. Even worse, if the proposed settlement
is not found to be in good faith, not only is the confidentiality lost,
but thereafter that defendant would be subject to the dangers associ-
ated with having his adversaries know his financial worth. "
This problem is not present to the same degree in other situa-
tions in which financial information is involved, such as claims for
punitive damages. By the time plaintiff hears about the defendant's
financial information at the trial, the trial is usually almost over.
The defendant is not faced with having the plaintiff himself know
the information during the pretrial and settlement stages, and a pro-
tective order prohibiting the use of and access to the information af-
ter the trial seems adequate. For example, in Cobb v. Superior
Court, in which discovery of financial information relevant to puni-
tive damages was involved, the court attempted to give maximum
protection to the defendant's right of privacy by suggesting that the
discovery of the defendant's financial information be delayed to a
certain number of days before trial, sufficiently in advance to give an
opportunity to the plaintiff to challenge the information if necessary,
but sufficiently close to the trial to afford the additional protection to
the defendant of limiting the time period during which his adversa-
ries knew this information.2 The rationale for this decision was
that it would significantly limit the time during which plaintiff or his
attorney would have access to and the use of the information for
some sort of advantage unrelated to the actual merits of the
litigation.
The good faith settlement hearing, however, presents a unique
situation. This approach of limiting the time period during which
the adversary parties or their attorneys have knowledge of the set-
tling defendant's financial information is not possible because of the
timing of the good faith settlement hearing. Because it is a pretrial
proceeding which often takes place well before the actual trial on the
underlying litigation, disclosure of the settling defendant's financial
information at the hearing would enable his adversaries to have this
information for what could be a long period of time until the actual
trial.
The reasonable solution to this problem is for the trial court to
253. See supra text accompanying notes 172-77.
254. Cobb v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d at 551, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 566.
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use its discretion to structure the good faith settlement hearing in
such a way as to provide maximum privacy for the settling defend-
ant's financial affairs while at the same time providing a full and
fair hearing. If the settling defendant has requested and the court
has granted a discovery protective order limiting the disclosure of the
defendant's financial information to certain persons only, then the
court can retain this limited access by appropriate orders regarding
the good faith hearing itself and the documents filed for the hearing.
The court clearly possesses the power to institute the necessary
safeguards. A court has the power to control all proceedings before
it. 2" This power exists both as an inherent power of the court" 6 and
by statute, 57 and can be exercised in order to insure the orderly
administration of justice.'5
Additionally, because the good faith settlement hearing is a pre-
trial hearing similar to those conducted in other law and motion
matters, 5 the necessary procedures will not be difficult to institute.
In a good faith settlement hearing there is no right to a jury trial260
or in fact to any "trial" at all. Code of Civil Procedure section
877.6(b) specifically authorizes the court to conduct the hearing on
255. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 206, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427, 437-38
(1975). Keeler v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 596, 600, 297 P.2d 967, 970 (1956); Hays v.
Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 260, 264, 105 P.2d 975, 979 (1940);
256. While certain of the court's inherent and implied powers have "received legislative
definition," the statutes neither created not circumscribed the powers thus defined. Rosato v.
Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 206, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 437-38.
257. Id., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 128, 187 (West 1982). Section 187 provides:
When jurisdiction is, by the constitution or this code, or by any other statute,
conferred on a court or judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry it into
effect are also given; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course of
proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this code or the statute, any suita-
ble process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most
conformable to the spirit of this code.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 187 (West 1980).
Section 128 represents a statutory confirmation of the court's power "[tlo provide for the
orderly conduct of proceedings before it" and "[t]o control in furtherance of justice, the conduct
. . . of all . . . persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every
manner pertaining thereto." CAL. CIV. PRoC. CODE § 128 (West 1982), quoted in Rosato v.
Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 206-07, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
258. Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 206, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 437-38.
259. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1985). A good faith settlement hear-
ing is considered a "law and motion" matter under the California Rules of Court. CAL. R.
CT. 303(a)(1) defines "law and motion" as any proceeding "on application before trial for an
order." The Civil Law and Motion Rules of the California Rules of Court are therefore appli-
cable to a good faith settlement hearing conducted in California state court. Cf. CAL. R. CT.
301.
260. Widson v. International Harvester Co., 153 Cal. App. 3d 45, 56-57, 200 Cal.
Rptr. 136, 144 (1984).
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the basis of affidavits and counteraffidavits. 261 The court may receive
other evidence at the hearing in its discretion, 62 but the court need
not take any evidence at all. 63
Nor is the court required to hear oral argument at the hear-
ing. 2 4 The court could require that all arguments on the issue of the
financial condition of the settling defendant that pertain to the good
faith of the proposed settlement be submitted in writing.266 If the
court preferred oral argument, argument could take place in cham-
bers or at a closed hearing at which only the adverse attorneys, i.e.,
those for the settling and nonsettling joint tortfeasors, were pre-
261. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(b) (West Supp. 1985).
262. Id.
263. Id.; see also CAL. R. CT. 323 which provides: "Evidence received at a law and
motion hearing shall be by declaration and affidavit ... without testimony or cross-examina-
tion, except as allowed in the court's discretion for cause shown or as permitted by local rule."
264. A court may dispense with or limit oral argument in its discretion at a pretrial law
and motion matter. In re Marriage of Lemen, 113 Cal. App. 3d 769, 784, 170 Cal. Rptr. 642,
649 (1980); Muller v. Muller, 141 Cal. App. 2d 722, 731, 297 P.2d 789, 794 (1956); R. WEIL
& J. BROWN, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 1
9.138 (Rutter 1985); see also Gillette v. Gillette, 180 Cal. App. 2d 777, 781, 4 Cal. Rptr. 700,
703 (1960) (court went even further and held there was no right to oral argument in a civil
proceeding tried before the court without a jury).
One court has suggested that due process may require adequate oral argument in "those
complex law and motion cases in which the decision has an immediate and dramatic impact on
the parties." Cal-American Income Property Fund VII v. Brown Development Corp., 138
Cal. App. 3d 268, 273 n.3, 187 Cal. Rptr. 703, 705 n.3 (1982). That case involved the ap-
pointment of a receiver or the confirmation or a receiver's sale of property which was the
subject of the litigation, but the court did not decide if the trial court's order limiting argument
impared due process rights. The court stated:
Our admonition to the trial court to expend time allowed for oral argument in
those complex law and motion cases where the decision has an immediate and
dramatic impact upon the parties is no more than a reminder to ourselves that
the quality and appearance of justice is always improved when the judge listens
before he decides.
Id.
It is unclear whether the determination of the good faith of a settlement would constitute
a "complex matter" having an "immediate and dramatic impact on the parties" although a
good argument can be made that it is. However, any due process requirement could certainly
be met by the proposal in the text which allows oral argument with the adverse attorneys
present.
265. The filing of these papers should be under the same conditions set forth in the text
following infra note 267.
Most arguments for a law and motion hearing are submitted in writing in the form of a
Memorandum of Points and Authorities which contains "a statement of facts, a concise state-
ment of the law, evidence and arguments relied on, and a discussion of the statutes, cases, and
textbooks cited in support of the position advanced." CAL. R. CT. 313(b). Such a document is
required for the moving party by the California Rules of Court. If one is not submitted, the
court may construe the absence as an admission that the motion is not meritorious and the
court may thereby find cause for its denial. CAL. R. CT. 313(a). In practice, responding parties
also routinely file their arguments in writing in a Memorandum of Points and Authorities.
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sent."' If the court in its discretion desired to hear evidence as to the
settling defendant's financial condition, this too could take place with
266. In the case of an actual trial, while the court has the power to exclude from the
courtroom any witness not currently testifying, the court cannot exclude a party. CAL. EVID.
CODE § 777(a), (b) (West 1966). However, a good faith settlement hearing is a law and
motion matter and not a trial. See supra notes 254-58 and accompanying text. Courts often
conduct pretrial procedures in chambers or in camera with no one or no one but designated
attorneys present, such as the inspection of allegedly privileged documents by the judge, as part
of a discovery hearing. For example, the California Supreme Court suggested the holding of an
in camera hearing as a useful procedural device to accommodate considerations of both disclos-
ure and confidentiality when the discovery involved the financial information of bank custom-
ers. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d at 658, 542 P.2d at 980, 125 Cal.
Rptr. at 556.
Also, in In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 437 & n.23, 467 P.2d 557, 571 & n.23, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 829, 843 & n.23 (1970), the court stated that if the trial judge during a discovery dispute
was called upon to rule on the relevancy of information to which the psychiatrist-patient com-
munication privilege was claimed, the judge should take precautions to protect the confidential-
ity of the communications. For example, he might routinely permit such disclosure to be made
ex parte in his chambers. See also Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 607,
162 Cal. Rptr. 724, 734, in which the court ordered certain documents to be provided for its in
camera review so it could rule on a claim of privilege; see also Telegram Tribune v. Munici-
pal Court, 166 Cal. App. 1072, 213 Cal. Rptr. 7, 11 (1985) (allowing a hearing on defend-
ant's motion in a criminal case to close his preliminary hearing to the public to be conducted
by allowing the defendant to testify as to confidential matters in camera with the submission of
written questions by adverse counsel and preservation of the record for later appellate review).
The court in Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d at 606, 162 Cal. Rptr. at
733-34, noted that an in camera determination is authorized by CAL. EvID. CODE § 915,
subdivision (b) when the court is ruling on a claim of privilege of official information, identity
of informer or trade secret. The California Supreme Court has suggested that the procedure
outlined in that section also be utilized by a court when ruling upon a claim of privilege of
psychotherapist-patient communications which depends upon the content of the communica-
tion. In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 437 n.23, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970). By the
same reasoning, such a procedure would also seem warranted when other types of confidential
information are concerned, such as financial information. CAL. EvID. CODE § 915(b) provides:
When a court is ruling on a claim of privilege [of official information, identity of
informer, or trade secret] . . . and is unable to do so without requiring disclos-
ure of the information claimed to be privileged, the court may require the per-
son from whom disclosure is sought or the person authorized to claim the privi-
lege, or both, to disclose the information in chambers out of the presence and
hearing of all persons except the person authorized to claim the privilege and
such other persons as the person authorized to claim the privilege is willing to
have present. If the judge determines that the information is privileged, neither
he nor any other person may ever disclose, without the consent of a person
authorized to permit disclosure, what was disclosed in the course of the proceed-
ings in chambers.
Id.
In camera proceedings are also utilized in the federal courts. In Ronson Corp. v. Liavifin
Aktiengellschaft, 370 F. Supp. 597, 600-01 (D.N.J. 1974), af'd, 493 F.2d 1401, affd 497
F.2d 394, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870, the court held that both parties could submit confidential
commercial information to the court in camera pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 26 which provides
a remedy to protect any party from financial embarrassment, undue burden, or expense.
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only these attorney's present. 2 7
These alternatives provide the attorneys for the opposing parties
equal opportunity to present their positions to the judge. Each attor-
ney is allowed to read the other's declarations and arguments regard-
ing the financial condition of the settlor and to submit rebuttal evi-
dence. In addition, each may hear the other's evidence or arguments
if the court allows an oral presentation. Therefore, the hearing
would not be ex parte or in camera as those terms are generally
used to describe proceedings when only one side is present.2 68
The solution to the problem of maintaining confidentiality of
the settling defendant's financial information contained in the docu-
ments filed for the good faith hearing is also not difficult. The court
can accomplish the goal of limiting access to the settling defendant's
financial information to only the attorneys and experts for the non-
settling joint tortfeasors by ordering that any papers containing in-
formation regarding the settling defendant's financial condition: a) be
filed separately from other documents regarding the good faith issue;
b) be sealed; c) be served only on the attorneys for the nonsettling
joint tortfeasors; and d) not be disclosed by those attorneys to any
other persons except specified experts.
In summary, the court can and should take care to ensure that
the discovery protections necessitated by the settling defendant's right
of privacy are extended past the discovery stage to the good faith
settlement hearing itself.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts attempting to apply the test for a good faith settlement
recently established by the California Supreme Court in Tech-Bilt
will face numerous unresolved issues. This article has addressed two
threshold procedural problems that have been created because the
new criteria for good faith include the settling joint tortfeasor's fi-
nancial condition and insurance policy limits.
The first problem involves the discovery of the financial condi-
267. Id.
268. A significant problem might arise with a court order which grants one litigant an
in camera hearing while excluding the other when the evidence received was dispositive of the
litigation. See People v. Sahagun, 89 Cal. App. 3d 1, 25, 152 Cal. Rptr. 233, 249 (1979) (a
criminal case in which the court raised, although specifically declined to decide, this issue; the
court did reverse the trial court's granting of an in camera hearing to the defendant when the
information turned out not to be confidential, and the People were not thereafter afforded the
opportunity to question and explore the accuracy of the information, argue its significance, or
offer rebuttal evidence).
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tion and insurance policy limits of the settlor by the other parties to
the action. The nonsettling joint tortfeasors have a legitimate interest
in this information once the settlor claims that his settlement is in
good faith by virtue of his financial resources. While there is proba-
bly no obstacle to allowing discovery regarding the settlor's insur-
ance, the settlor's constitutionally mandated right of privacy must be
considered in determining the scope of discovery of his other finan-
cial information. A basic conflict exists between the nonsettlors' need
to discover this financial information and the settlor's privacy interest
in protecting this information from unnecessary disclosure. The
court should resolve this conflict by issuing a protective order appro-
priately tailored to the facts of each case. This article has suggested
certain guidelines a trial court can use in fashioning the necessary
protective orders.
Assuming the trial court finds that a protective order is neces-
sary to limit the disclosure of the settling tortfeasor's financial infor-
mation, another problem the court will face is maintaining the confi-
dentiality of that information at. the good faith settlement hearing
itself and in papers filed in preparation for that hearing. This article
has, therefore, also offered suggestions a trial judge can use to struc-
ture the hearing in a manner which will preserve the confidentiality
obtained at the discovery stage through a protective order.
These proposed judicial guidelines to control both discovery and
the good faith settlement hearing will enable the parties to fully pre-
pare for and litigate the issue of the good faith of a proposed settle-
ment within the parameters of Tech-Bilt. In addition, the invasion of
the settlor's right of privacy can be kept within constitutionally per-
missible limits. In this way, the interests of all parties can be accom-
modated and the trial judge can turn his attention to the ultimate
issue of whether or not the proposed settlement is in good faith.
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